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ABSTRACT
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has shaped the Internet
as we know it. This legislation shields online service providers from
secondary copyright infringement liability in exchange for takedown of
infringing content of their users. Yet online payment processors, the
backbone of $300 billion in U.S. e-commerce, are completely outside of
the DMCA’s protection. This Article uses PayPal, the most popular
online payment company in the U.S., to illustrate the growing risk of
secondary liability for payment processors. First it looks at jurispru-
dence that expands secondary copyright liability online, and explains
how it might be applied to PayPal. Then it considers legislative propos-
als and industry-self regulation that similarly target an increasing role
for payment processors in the fight against online infringement. It ar-
gues that the introduction of a DMCA-like safe harbor for online pay-
ment processors offers a fairer and more efficient option for all
stakeholders than the status quo of gradually expanding liability risk. It
concludes with a discussion of important initial considerations in the
design of such a safe harbor.
* LL.M., Stanford Law School, J.D. Western University. Thank you to Daphne
Keller, Mark Lemley, George Addy and Matthew Gasperetti for their thoughtful input on the
early drafts of this paper. All errors and omissions are my own. The title of this article is based
on PayPal’s 2016 Super Bowl advertisement promoting the company as the future of money,
in contrast with stodgy images of “old money” fiat currency systems, see https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=1dF9t_xQGks.
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INTRODUCTION
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides online in-
termediaries with a liability shield from the copyright infringement of their
users, provided certain conditions are met.1 Congress made clear that the
DMCA’s purpose was to foster the robust expansion of electronic commerce
in two ways: (1) by reducing the legal uncertainties of conducting business
online and (2) by creating mechanisms to combat online infringement.2 The
legislation was designed to allay the fears of copyright holders about their
works being made available online, where unauthorized copies proliferate
with unprecedented ease. Given the focus on promoting commerce online, it
seems odd that payment processors—the lynchpins of all electronic com-
merce—are not within the protection of the DMCA. Granting such protec-
1. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
2. S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 2 (1998).
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tion would certainly have contributed to the congressional goal of creating
“a thriving electronic marketplace” for intellectual property works online.3
One possible explanation for the omission is that Congress did not have
payment processors in mind when the DMCA was passed. PayPal—now the
most popular online payment service provider in the U.S.—was founded in
1998, coincidentally the same year the DMCA was enacted. But credit card
companies had been offering online payment processing for several years by
then, with the first online payments occurring around 1994.4 By 1996 an
estimated $500-600 million in online transactions were being processed,5
almost all of which were credit card payments.6 This growth was sufficiently
rapid that Congress would have been aware of the technology and its rele-
vance to e-commerce. Although online payments were relatively new, it is
conceivable that a future-oriented law, such as the DMCA, might have in-
corporated protection for online payment processors at the time it was
passed.
A more likely explanation for the omission of payment processors from
the DMCA safe harbor is that Congress never foresaw secondary liability
extending to such intermediaries.7 In 1998, secondary copyright infringe-
ment litigation had yet to name any payment processors as defendants. The-
ories of secondary copyright infringement were significantly more
circumscribed and, as this Article explains, expanded in scope only after the
DMCA was passed.
Reconsideration of a safe harbor for payment processors is timely, given
the growing scope of liability for secondary copyright infringement. In fact,
the U.S. Copyright Office is in the midst of a public study looking at the
impact and effectiveness of the DMCA safe harbor provisions.8 One ques-
tion posed by the study is whether courts have properly construed the enti-
ties and activities covered by the Section 512 safe harbors.9 This relates to
3. H.R. Rep. No. 105–551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998).
4. See Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523 n.103
(2015); see also Michael Grothaus, You’ll Never Guess What The First Thing Ever Sold On
The Internet Was, FAST COMPANY, Nov. 26, 2015, https://www.fastcompany.com/3054025/
fast-feed/youll-never-guess-what-the-first-thing-ever-sold-on-the-internet-was.
5. Christopher Anderson, In Search of the Perfect Market, THE ECONOMIST, May 8
1997, http://www.economist.com/node/596262.
6. Robert F. Stankey, Internet Payment Systems: Legal Issues Facing Businesses, Con-
sumers and Payment Service Providers, 6 J. OF COMM. L. AND POL’Y 11, 12 (1998).
7. Bridy, supra note 4, at 1538–39.
8. Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 80 Fed. Reg. 81,862
(Dec. 31, 2015); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 512 STUDY, https://www.copyright.gov/
policy/section512/; More broadly, the House Judiciary Committee recently concluded a review
of copyright law to assess whether it is keeping pace with the digital age. Press Release,
Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Chairman Goodlatte Announces Comprehensive Review of Copy-
right Law (Apr. 24, 2013) https://judiciary.house.gov/press-release/chairmangoodlatteannoun
cescomprehensivereviewofcopyrightlaw/.
9. Section 512 Study, supra note 8, at 81,868.
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the broader question of whether our nation’s copyright laws are keeping
pace with the digital age, which Congress has been studying intently in re-
cent years.10
This Article explains why online payment processors face increasing
risk of secondary copyright liability. Then it considers whether DMCA-like
safe harbors should be expanded to such intermediaries. PayPal is used as an
example throughout the analysis because of its significant popularity and
size—post eBay spinoff, PayPal is the fourth largest payment processor in
the U.S., trailing only the major credit card companies.11
After a brief introductory section on e-commerce and the current
DMCA safe harbor regime, Part I traces the expansion of secondary copy-
right liability to online intermediaries that are increasingly tangential to the
direct infringement. It then applies the reasoning of the leading case on sec-
ondary liability of credit card companies for online infringement, Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Visa International Service, Ass’n, to the business model of PayPal.
The analysis suggests that online payment processors are at a higher risk for
secondary copyright liability than traditional credit card companies, due to
the differences in their business models. Finally, it examines broader trends,
including recently proposed legislation and industry self-regulation, that also
indicate increasing demands on payment processors to police online copy-
right infringement.
Part II looks at two major options for policy and lawmakers in relation
to online payment processor liability: (1) continuing the current approach of
industry self-regulation by payment processors and the slow evolution of
common law liability risk or (2) intervening with the enactment of a DMCA-
like liability safe harbor for some or all payment processors. It concludes
that the statutory safe harbor is a fairer and more efficient option, remedying
the risk of over-blocking of legitimate commerce that characterizes the sta-
tus quo. Part III discusses important initial considerations in the design of
such a copyright liability safe harbor for online payment processors.
A. Background: E-commerce, PayPal, and Online
Intermediary Safe Harbors
Along with other key pieces of legislation passed in the 1990s, the
DMCA is credited with creating a permissive online legal environment that
made the U.S. a worldwide center for Internet innovation and online com-
merce. As one author explains, “[j]ust as nineteenth-century American
10. See, e.g., Congressional Hearings and Statements to Congress, U.S. COPYRIGHT OF-
FICE, https://www.copyright.gov/laws/hearings (last visited Oct. 15, 2017); U.S. Copyright Re-
view, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/us-copyright-law-
review (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
11. Jim Daly, Spinoff Ranks PayPal as Solid No. 4 Among Payments Companies by
Market Cap, DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/spi-
noff-ranks-paypal-as-a-solid-no-4-among-payments-companies-by-market-cap/.
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judges altered the common law in order to subsidize industrial development,
American judges and legislators altered the law at the turn of the Millennium
to promote the development of Internet enterprise.”12 Since the DMCA was
enacted in 1998, online commerce has become an integral part of day-to-day
life. In 1998, U.S. retail e-commerce sales were estimated at almost $5 bil-
lion.13 This rose exponentially to $299 billion in 2014, the most recent Cen-
sus Bureau estimate.14
The way customers make payments online is evolving quickly as well.
In 2014, for the first time in global e-commerce, “alternative” payment
methods overtook credit card payments as the preferred forms of payment.15
Newer modalities, such as PayPal and Alipay, are displacing more tradi-
tional credit cards as the consumer’s choice for online payments to busi-
nesses and to peers. This shift toward alternative payment methods is
expected to be most dramatic in North America,16 which has lagged in adop-
tion of alternative payments compared to that of other regions.
A corollary to this growth in e-commerce has been equal or greater
growth in online intellectual property infringement. Digital works can be
copied, distributed, and even sold with unprecedented ease. The amount of
infringing material accessed via the Internet more than doubled from 2010 to
2012 alone.17 An estimated one-quarter of all bandwidth on the Internet in
North America, Europe, and Asia is devoted to hosting, sharing, and acquir-
ing infringing material.18 The flexibility and anonymity of online sales make
it significantly harder to catch merchants engaging in such commerce. The
rise of e-commerce has also facilitated global sales of physical products that
infringe intellectual property rights. The estimated total value of counterfeit
goods sold worldwide in 2015 was $1.8 trillion (online and offline), and the
12. Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 668–69
(2014).
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015 ANNUAL RETAIL TRADE SURVEY: U.S. RETAIL TRADE
SALES - TOTAL AND E-COMMERCE, https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html (2017); Monthly
& Annual Retail Trade: Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/retail/defi-
nitions.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (defining e-commerce to include sales of goods and
services where the buyer places an order, or the price and terms of the sale are negotiated, over
an Internet, mobile device, e-mail or other comparable online system; payment may or may not
be made online).
14. Id.
15. Global Payments Report Preview, WORLDPAY, 5–7 (Nov. 2015), http://offers.world
payglobal.com/rs/850-JOA-856/images/GlobalPaymentsReportNov2015.pdf. Alternative pay-
ments include all types of payment other than those run on global Visa, MasterCard or AmEx
networks, but payment services like PayPal and Alipay account for a significant 20.5% overall.
PayPal is included in the sub-category dubbed “ewallets.” It is not clear how the Worldpay
report categorizes services where PayPal uses Visa and MasterCard networks as the underlying
payment method.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Section 512 Study, supra note 8, at 81,862.
18. Id.
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U.S. trade representative has predicted that online sales of pirated goods may
exceed those in physical markets.19
The result is that copyright holders are clamoring for better solutions to
enforce their rights online. Instead of chasing after each end user, which can
be futile and costly, copyright holders are increasing efforts to vindicate
their rights through or against online intermediaries. The past two decades
have seen a “seismic shift” away from suing direct infringers toward suing
indirect facilitators that have “less and less connection to the act of infringe-
ment.”20 Online intermediaries who supply technology have increasingly
been held liable for infringement by their users, at least when the DMCA
does not apply. Payment processors are a prominent online intermediary in
the facilitation of e-commerce, including transactions that involve intellec-
tual property rights infringement, and appear to be a target of choice for
rights enforcement. The question is whether online commerce will continue
to thrive if payment processors become targets for secondary copyright in-
fringement suits.
B. The Current Immunity Scheme for Online Intermediaries
The combination of two pieces of legislation, the DMCA and the Com-
munications Decency Act (CDA), provide many online intermediaries in the
U.S. with broad immunity from monetary damages related to their users’
acts online.21 Section 230 of the CDA provides that intermediaries, such as
Internet service providers (ISPs), are not considered the publishers or speak-
ers of the content of their users.22 This establishes broad immunity from
causes of action attempting to hold such online intermediaries liable for in-
formation made available online by third parties. The CDA does not, how-
ever, provide immunity from intellectual property laws.23
This intellectual property “gap” in the CDA is filled by the DMCA. The
DMCA provides broad immunity from user’s copyright infringement for
much of the conduct of online service providers, provided certain conditions
are met. The four types of activities protected from infringement liability
are: (1) transmitting or routing the material of others over an online network
(generally applicable to true “conduits,” such as Internet access providers);
(2) temporarily storing or caching the material of others to be able to trans-
19. Luxury goods: Counterfeit.com, THE ECONOMIST (July 30, 2015), https://www.econ-
omist.com/news/business/21660111-makers-expensive-bags-clothes-and-watches-are-fighting-
fakery-courts-battle.
20. Mark A. Lemley and R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1353 (2004).
21. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
22. Id. §§ 230(c)(1), 230(e)(3) (stating that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by an-
other information content provider,” and preempting any state law to the contrary).
23. Id. § 230(e)(2).
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mit at a later time to other users; (3) storing information at the direction of
an end user; and (4) operating information location tools that refer or link
users to infringing online material (often applicable to search engines). Pay-
ment processors are not within the scope of these categories and have no
protection from liability under the DMCA.24
The provisions applicable to search engines (“information location
tools”) provide a good example of how the safe harbor operates.25 To benefit
from immunity, the search engine operator must either (1) have no actual
knowledge or “aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent”—so called “red flag” knowledge—or (2) expeditiously
remove or disable access to infringing material of which it knows or is
aware.26 In other words, if there is knowledge of infringement, the interme-
diary’s immunity is conditioned on its implementation of a notice and take-
down regime that removes infringing content upon receipt of a DMCA-
compliant notice from the copyright holder.27 The theory behind placing the
notice burden on rights holders is that “copyright holders know precisely
what materials they own” and are therefore better positioned than in-
termediaries to efficiently determine what material is copyrighted and what
is not.28 The DMCA explicitly states that it imposes no affirmative duty on
online service providers to investigate whether or not user content infringes
copyright.29
There are other conditions that some online intermediaries must meet to
qualify for the DMCA safe harbor: an agent must be delegated to receive
notifications of infringement and a policy providing for termination of repeat
infringers must be reasonably implemented.30 Lastly, the intermediary may
not receive “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity”
if they have the right and ability to control that activity.31
24. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (“De-
fendants are not ‘service providers’ within the scope of the DMCA, they are not eligible for
these safe harbors.”).
25. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
26. Id. § 512 (d)(1)(A), (B) and (C).
27. The elements required in such a notification are set out in Id. § 512(c)(3).
28. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“Copyright holders know precisely what materials they own, and are thus better
able to efficiently identify infringing copies than service providers like Veoh, who cannot
readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is not.”).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113–14 (9th
Cir. 2007) (Section 512(c) “impose[s] no such investigative duties on service providers,” and
“place[s] the burden of policing copyright infringement . . . squarely on the owners of the
copyright”).
30. 17 U.S.C. §512(i) (policy must “provide [. . .] for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network
who are repeat infringers”); see also Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1109–111 (explaining what con-
stitutes a “reasonably implemented policy”).
31. E.g. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
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Overall, the DMCA creates an optional trade-off scheme for in-
termediaries; if the intermediary implements a reasonable content-takedown
policy and meets the other requirements, they gain the safe harbor protection
from liability for monetary and most equitable remedies arising from the
copyright infringing content of others on their systems. Alternatively, the
intermediary is free to ignore notice from rights holders and gamble on
whether or not they will be found liable at common law for secondary copy-
right infringement.
I. ONLINE PAYMENT PROCESSORS AT RISK: JURISPRUDENCE ON
SECONDARY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, PROPOSED LEGISLATION,
AND “VOLUNTARY” INDUSTRY REGULATION
This Part traces the recent expansion of secondary copyright liability for
online intermediaries. It then looks at the challenges this expansion raises for
payment processors, using PayPal as an example and applying the reasoning
of the leading case on secondary liability of credit card companies for online
infringement, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service, Ass’n (Visa). It
then examines proposed legislation targeting the same payment in-
termediaries and the industry self-regulation compromise that resulted. This
brewing storm of legislative change and common law developments in pay-
ment processor intellectual property liability is well summarized by PayPal
in its 2015 financial risk disclosure:32
Changes in law have increased the penalties for intermediaries pro-
viding payment services for certain illegal activities and additional
payments-related proposals are under active consideration by gov-
ernment authorities. Intellectual property rights owners or govern-
ment authorities may seek to bring legal action against providers of
payments solutions, including PayPal, that are peripherally involved
in the sale of infringing items.
A. Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability Expands
Secondary copyright infringement liability has been expanding since the
late 1990s, as copyright holders try various approaches to enforce their
rights against intermediaries.33 These cases form the backdrop to many of
the concepts discussed in Visa. In the first of a series of seminal cases, Fo-
32. PAYPAL INC., Form 10-K (2015), https://investor.paypal-corp.com/secfiling.cfm?fil
ingID=1633917-16-113&CIK=1633917.
33. See e.g. John F. Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expan-
sion of Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1821
(2013) (“Copyright owners, accordingly, are attempting to increase the breadth and expense of
secondary copyright liability for Internet platforms by institutionalizing uncertainty within le-
gal doctrine.”); See generally Lemley & Reese, supra note 20 (tracing the significant shift
toward copyright holders suing “facilitators” of infringement, rather than end users).
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novisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction Inc., the operator of a physical “swap meet”
was held liable for the sale of infringing goods at his marketplace.34 Fo-
novisa hinted at what was to come for online intermediaries in A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., where a similar theory was applied to find
Napster liable.35 Napster was an infamous operator of a centralized elec-
tronic file sharing system that was used predominantly to exchange unli-
censed, copyrighted music files. The Napster and Fonovisa cases both
interpreted vicarious copyright liability broadly, expanding the scope of
what constitutes financial benefit and control, elements of secondary copy-
right infringement that are addressed in more detail below.36
Shortly thereafter, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
and similar cases extended secondary copyright infringement liability to the
distribution of software that enabled peer-to-peer exchange of copyrighted
music.37 Unlike Napster’s centralized file exchange, Grokster’s software was
based on a distributed system of file searching and sharing. Grokster played
no central role as intermediary, other than the initial software distribution,
but it was still held liable. The Supreme Court revived the concept of “in-
ducing” infringement, basing liability on the intent to induce infringement,
despite the product being capable of substantial non-infringing use.38 Some
consider Grokster’s inducement theory to be a distinct category of secondary
liability, while others see it as a subcategory of contributory copyright in-
fringement.39 Regardless of the categorization, Grokster significantly broad-
34. See generally Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)
(establishing that a copyright holder has an actionable claim).
35. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
“Napster provides ‘the site and facilities’ for direct infringement” and citing Fonovisa).
36. See Blevins, supra note 33, at 1846 (tracing the expansion of vicarious liability from
a narrow, agency law related doctrine).
37. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919–20 (2005)
(“defendants . . . distribute free software products that allow computer users to share electronic
files through peer-to-peer networks, so called because users’ computers communicate directly
with each other, not through central servers”); see also in re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334
F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (“copies of the songs reside on the computers of the users and
not on Aimster’s own server. . .”).
38. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 935–37; see generally Debra R. Rydarowski, The Tor-
tious Beginnings of Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Concerted Action Key to Grok-
ster, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 215 (2006) (analyzing how Grokster and another respondent,
StreamCast networks, Inc. faced litigation from rights holders, alleging contributory infringe-
ment and vicarious liability for the direct infringement committed by Grokster users).
39. Paul Goldstein, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.1.3 (3d ed. Supp. 2013) (describing
contributory infringement as long including inducement as a “separate, but sometimes overlap-
ping, ground for secondary liability”); Mark Bartholomew, Copyright, Trademark and Secon-
dary Liability after Grokster, 32 COLUM. L.J. & ARTS 445, 465–66 (2009) (referring to
Grokster as creating a new category of contributory copyright infringement liability); Sverker
K. Hogberg, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 913 (2006) (“In declaring a new standard of “inducement” liability,
the Court has made it clear that copyright law encompasses a separate, intent-based secondary
liability doctrine.”).
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ened the potential for secondary copyright infringement liability by
reinvigorating the inducement grounds.
The series of cases against intermediaries such as Fonovisa, and file-
sharing companies like Napster, Grokster, and others, have all resulted in
findings of secondary copyright infringement by the intermediary for the
copyright violations of the company’s end users. They illustrate how secon-
dary copyright liability is slowly expanding to reach “a wider array of de-
fendants with increasingly tangential relationships to the direct infringer.”40
B. Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability and Visa
In 2007, credit card processors became the latest intermediary targeted
by copyright holders in attempts to expand secondary copyright infringe-
ment liability. Visa involved third parties purchasing unlicensed copies of
risqué photos in which the plaintiff, Perfect 10, held copyright.41  The
purchases were made online, in many cases using a Visa or MasterCard
credit card. The Ninth Circuit found Visa and MasterCard were not liable for
secondary copyright infringement under theories of contributory infringe-
ment or vicarious infringement.
The following section considers the analysis of each of these types of
secondary copyright infringement in Visa, along with a recent case that
adopted the dissenting approach from Visa, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline
Processing Corp. (Gucci).42 It then analyzes how each theory of liability
might be applied to PayPal to highlight potential differences in the analysis
between traditional credit card companies and the newer generation of on-
line payment processers.
1. Contributory Copyright Infringement in Visa
Visa synthesizes recent cases to describe contributory copyright in-
fringement liability as requiring (1) knowledge of another’s infringing con-
duct and (2) either material contribution to, or inducement of, the direct
infringement.43 This analytical structure was applied to Visa and Master-
Card’s conduct, but their role was too attenuated for liability. However, the
dissenting opinion in Visa, and the Gucci decision that followed that dissent
would have held Visa and MasterCard contributorily liable.
40. Batholomew, supra note 39, at 445.
41. Visa, 494 F.3d at 793.
42. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252–53
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
43. Visa, 494 F.3d at 795; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101; Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d
1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc.,
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.1971)).
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a. Material Contribution: The Visa Dissent Lives On
In determining whether there was a material contribution by the credit
card companies to the copyright infringement of their customers, the Visa
majority focuses on a “site and facilities” theory. This theory—which
originated with in Fonovisa and was then applied in Napster—imposes lia-
bility on defendants who supply a physical or virtual “centralized place”
where infringing works can be “collected, sorted, found and bought, sold or
exchanged.”44 The provision of this centralized site is sufficient to establish
a material contribution to liability when the defendant “actively strives to
provide the environment and the market for counterfeit . . . sales to thrive.”45
The majority in Visa concludes that the payment processors have not created
any such site where infringing activity occurs, and the court identifies this as
a key distinction from the prior cases where liability was imposed.
The majority’s position is also rooted in its separation of the act of pay-
ment and from the infringing acts online. It reasons that the infringing act of
“reproduction, alteration, display, and distribution” of the disputed photos
online is separate from the act of payment for copies of such photos.  Al-
though the majority concedes that payment systems make it easier to profit
from infringement, they reason the payment processor’s contribution does
not reach the threshold of materiality because infringement could occur on-
line even if the defendants did not use the credit card payment system. The
infringing images would still be displayed on unauthorized websites absent
payment. The majority distinguishes past cases in which intermediaries were
held liable, finding the likes of Fonovisa, Napster, and Grokster all played
more integral location and distribution roles than Visa or MasterCard.46
Judge Kozinski takes issue with this distinction in a strongly worded
dissent. He emphasizes that online payment is not separable from the act of
infringement as the majority claims. First, he points out that the plaintiff,
Perfect 10, claims the infringement is “by sale” of the copyrighted images,
making it impossible to separate that sale from the infringing acts of “repro-
duction, alteration, display or distribution,” as the majority does.47 Second,
he argues the majority’s position is inconsistent with Perfect 10 Inc. v. Ama-
zon.com, Inc. (Amazon),48 in which the court found Google’s search engine
materially contributed to copyright infringement when it was used to help
find infringing images, even though this was also not an act of reproduction,
alternation, display or distribution. Judge Kozinski concludes that “distribu-
44. Visa, 494 F.3d at 799.
45. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 264.
46. Visa, 494 F.3d at 796.
47. Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
48. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) Although there
was a finding of contributory infringement in Amazon, Google’s conduct was ultimately found
likely to constitute fair use.
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tion and payment are . . . like love and marriage—you can’t have one with-
out the other.”49
Judge Kozinski then goes on to reject the majority’s attempt to distin-
guish search services in Amazon from payment services in Visa based on the
availability of alternatives. The majority argues infringement could continue
even absent credit card payments because of “other viable funding mecha-
nisms,” which make the payment services non-material to infringement.50
Judge Kozinski observes that if the availability of alternatives determined
materiality, the correct position would have been to find materiality for the
credit card defendants in Visa but not for Google in Amazon.51 There are a
wide variety of alternatives to Google for locating infringing images on the
web, including the multitude of other search engines, e-mails, online chat,
messages on discussion forums, or peer-to-peer networking, yet Google was
found to have materially contributed to infringement.52 In contrast, substi-
tutes for credit cards in online payment at the time of Visa were almost non-
existent. Judge Kozinski summarizes his position by noting “[i]f it mattered
whether search engines or credit cards were more important to peddling in-
fringing content on the Internet, the cards would win hands down.”53
In Judge Kozinski’s dissent, he argues the better approach to analyzing
materiality is not to look at alternatives but instead to consider whether the
action by the intermediary “substantially assists” in the infringement.54 As in
Amazon, Judge Kozinski would impose liability when a party has knowledge
that infringing content was made available using their tools and “could take
simple measures to prevent further damage” to the copyrighted works but
fails to do so.55 He finds this test is easily met in Visa, where the defendants
“know about the infringements; they profit from them; they are intimately
and causally involved in a vast number of infringing transactions that could
not be consummated if they refused to process the payments; they have
ready means to stop the infringements.”56
49. Visa, 494 F.3d at 818.
50. Id. at 797.
51. Id. at 813 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“If the test for contributory infringement really
were whether ‘infringement could continue on a large scale [without the aid of the defendant]
because other viable funding mechanisms are available’, Amazon should have absolved
Google of liability because of the availability of such obvious alternatives. But Amazon held
that Google could be liable for contributory infringement because it ‘substantially assists’
users in finding infringing materials; the existence of other means of infringement was not
even considered because no case has suggested this to be a relevant consideration.”) (quoting
the Visa majority).
52. Id. at 812–13.
53. Id. at 814.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 811 (quoting Amazon, Inc., 487 F.3d at 729).
56. Id at 816.
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Judge Kozinski’s dissent was picked up in a 2010 trademark infringe-
ment case, Gucci.57 In this preliminary ruling, the Southern District of New
York allowed the luxury brand’s claims of contributory trademark infringe-
ment to proceed, but not their vicarious trademark infringement claims.58
The defendants were three payment processors who provided their services
to the operator of TheBagAddiction.com, a website devoted to selling coun-
terfeit purses. Durango, one of the defendant payment processors, acted as a
middleman to connect merchants like TheBagAddiction.com’s owners with
payment processors who in turn issued credit card merchant accounts. The
two other defendants, Frontline and Woodforest, provided card processing
services and banking services, respectively, to the website operator.
Throughout the decision, Judge Baer relies on Judge Kozinski’s strongly
worded dissent from Visa. He finds plausible claims of contributory trade-
mark infringement based on “direct control and monitoring of the instrumen-
tality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark,” as well as a
strong inference of knowledge or willful blindness as to the direct infringe-
ment.59 This analysis reflects a difference between contributory infringement
in trademark and copyright; in copyright, control is an element of vicarious
rather than contributory infringement. Woodforest and Frontline were both
found to have plausible control and knowledge of the trademark violations
by TheBagAddiction.com.
Judge Baer distinguishes the Visa majority based on whether the pay-
ment was “an essential step in the infringement process.”60 In Visa, the in-
fringement itself occurred online, so the majority differentiated between the
act of credit card payment and the separate act of the website continuing to
post infringing content without any payment. The credit card service provid-
ers lacked control, since they had no ability to remove or directly stop distri-
bution of images online. In contrast, in Gucci, the physical shipment of
goods did not occur until the credit card approval was obtained. Judge Baer
found that for physical shipments of goods “it is not possible to distribute by
sale without receiving compensation, so payment is in fact part of the in-
fringement process.”61 Frontline and Woodforest plausibly had control be-
cause the goods would not be shipped without approval of payment from
their credit card services. Judge Baer found the website was “functionally
dependent” on the credit card processing to sell the goods, despite potential
online payment alternatives, and this constituted sufficient control to plausi-
bly allege contributory trademark infringement.62 Judge Baer found Du-
57. Gucci Am., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d at 252 n.9.
58. Id. at 246 (denying the motion to dismiss by the defendants). There were no subse-
quent proceedings.
59. Id. at 249, 253 (quoting Visa, 494 F.3d at 807 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
60. Id. at 252 (quoting Visa, 494 F.3d at 811–12 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
61. Id. at 253 (quoting Visa, 494 F.3d at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
62. Id. at 253.
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rango’s middleman role of recruiting merchants provided insufficient control
over the sale of infringing products on the website to establish contributory
liability.63
The Gucci case must be taken with a grain of salt, as it was a prelimi-
nary motion to dismiss and there were no further proceedings. It is also a
decision in trademark law, rather than copyright, leading to some differences
in the legal analysis. The reasoning in the case is vague as to the distinction
being made between the different actors—Frontline and Woodforest are
found to have control and knowledge, but Durango is found to lack suffi-
cient control, yet to have plausibly induced infringement.64 Despite these
caveats, the case remains of interest because it takes up the gauntlet of Judge
Kozinski’s well-argued Visa dissent. Gucci inches the law toward recogni-
tion of secondary copyright infringement liability for payment processors, in
particular for processors that are not the major credit card companies pro-
tected by the Visa majority.
b. Knowledge of Direct Infringement
The second element of contributory copyright infringement is knowl-
edge of the conduct that constitutes direct infringement. Visa did not address
the knowledge element on the basis that the first element of material contri-
bution was not met. The dissenting opinion in Visa mentions at one point
that the defendants know of the infringement, but does not elaborate on how
or why they have such knowledge.65 Since Visa provides little insight on the
knowledge element, the DMCA and other cases are discussed here to elabo-
rate on the concept. Overall, knowledge has been a challenging concept for
the courts and its boundaries have not been clearly defined in the online
context.
The knowledge element is objective and is met by actual knowledge or
by imputed constructive knowledge based on awareness of facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity is objectively apparent. For either
type of knowledge, a generalized awareness of the potential for direct in-
63. Id. at 251 (finding a failure to prove control by Durango). See also id. at 249 (find-
ing a “strong inference” that all three defendants knew the owner of the counterfeit website
traded in counterfeit products or were willfully blind to that fact). However, Durango satisfied
the knowledge requirement and was found to potentially have induced infringement, as dis-
cussed below.
64. Id. Gucci also argued the payment processor and the bank had induced infringe-
ment. Both allegedly also advertised for high-risk merchants, but the conduct was less in-
volved than Durango’s actions. The court finds their conduct insufficient to plausibly plead an
inducement claim, but no further reasoning is provided. The claims for contributory trademark
infringement were allowed to proceed.
65. Visa, 494 F.3d at 810 (Kozinski, J. dissenting) (The defendants “know about the
infringements; they profit from them”).
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fringement is not sufficient.66 In Napster, for example, the court made clear
that “evidence of actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement” is re-
quired for secondary copyright infringement.67 In Grokster, the court clari-
fied that “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses
would not be enough . . . to subject a distributor to liability.”68
The DMCA safe harbor provisions also reference knowledge require-
ments; actual or “red flag” constructive knowledge of infringing conduct can
disqualify intermediaries from the liability safe harbors.69 Some cases treat
the elements that disqualify an intermediary from the safe harbor—such as
financial benefit and the right and ability to control—as being identical to
the parallel elements of claims for contributory infringement and vicarious
liability.70 Under this interpretation, the DMCA provides protection only
from direct infringement, because the establishment of secondary infringe-
ment also establishes elements such as knowledge that disqualify service
providers from the safe harbors.
The stronger argument is that the DMCA requires a higher degree of
knowledge than the “knowledge” that must be shown for contributory in-
fringement liability.71 In other words, “knowledge” sufficient to prove con-
tributory infringement liability would not preclude the intermediary from
being protected by the DMCA safe harbors.72 From the outset, Congress
made clear that the DCMA’s knowledge standard was intended to be distinct
from existing contributory-liability concepts.73 This interpretation is more
logical, because the DMCA was designed to provide liability protections for
online intermediaries. It is highly unlikely that an intermediary would be
66. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439
(1984) (general knowledge that VCRs may be used for infringement is not sufficient for secon-
dary copyright infringement liability as VCRs also have substantial non-infringing uses); Tif-
fany (NJ) Inc. v. Ebay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing willful blindness in the
context of the similar requirement for contributory trademark infringement, finding although
eBay “clearly possessed general knowledge as to counterfeiting on its website” that genera-
lized knowledge was insufficient to constitute “knowledge or reason to know” of trademark
infringement by third parties).
67. A&M Records Inc., 239 F.3d at 1021.
68. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 937.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), (d)(1)(A)–(B).
70. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
71. See Goldstein, supra note 39 at § 8.3.2; see also Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at
1114–15 (finding that although the defendant was aware of the activity occurring, it was not
necessarily aware that the activity infringed copyright).
72. See R. Anthony Reese, The Relationship Between the ISP Safe Harbors and the
Ordinary Rules of Copyright Liability, 32 Col. J.L. 427, 433–438 (2009) (discussion of the
distinction between knowledge under the DMCA compared to contributory copyright
infringement).
73. H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt.1, at 25 (1998) (“Once a provider becomes aware of a
red flag, however, it ceases to qualify for the exemption [under the DMCA]. This standard
differs from existing law, under which a defendant may be liable for contributory infringement
if it knows or should have known that material was infringing.”).
60 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 24:45
found directly liable for the infringing conduct of their users, so protection
from direct-infringement liability is not particularly useful. The utility of the
DMCA protections is that they shield intermediaries from the more plausible
risk of secondary-infringement liability.74 Cases in the DMCA context have
confirmed this, holding that even where there is fairly extensive factual
knowledge of infringing conduct, the safe harbors still apply. For example,
in one case involving the DMCA, e-mails to the intermediary’s executives
describing specific infringing content did not constitute sufficient knowledge
to deny the DMCA protections.75 In another, the knowledge that a high per-
centage of overall video streaming was infringing was insufficient to find
“knowledge” that defeated the DMCA protections.76
This distinction in the level of knowledge is also evident in the DMCA
notice system. When proper notice is provided, this is powerful evidence of
knowledge, and unless the content is removed or blocked, causes the inter-
mediary to lose the benefit of the DMCA safe harbor. But the DMCA’s
notice requirements are stringent and formal, and when they are not met
there is no obligation for the intermediary to act. Non-compliant attempts at
notice have been found insufficient even to prove red-flag knowledge of
users’ infringement.77 In contrast, the sources of knowledge for contributory
infringement may be much more widely drawn, with no specific form or
content requirements for a finding of knowledge.78 These differences result
in a higher bar to show “knowledge” sufficient to preclude the application of
DMCA safe harbors than for a finding of contributory copyright
infringement.
Conversely, the differences outlined above are a reminder that when the
DMCA is not at issue, the bar for finding the requisite knowledge may be
lower. The Gucci case, which did not involve the DMCA, provides an exam-
ple where knowledge of trademark infringement by payment processors was
found plausible. Both of the payment processors for which knowledge was
found had also investigated “chargebacks” from Visa and MasterCard for
74. See, e.g., Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability
Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 295, 305 (2002).
75. See UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d 1006 (stating that direct e-mails to executives
about specific infringing content and third-party communications about material on the im-
pugned site does not constitute “red flag” knowledge).
76. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32–35 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that
the generalized knowledge that “75–80% of all YouTube streams contained copyrighted mate-
rial. . . [and an] estimated . . . 60% of YouTube’s content was ‘premium’ copyrighted con-
tent—and that only 10% of the premium content was authorized” was not sufficient to find
knowledge of infringement under the DMCA, although the question of whether this consti-
tuted willful blindness was remanded to the District Court).
77. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108–09 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(finding notices provided by other copyright holders to Amazon were not sufficient to show
Amazon had red flag knowledge of the infringement of Corbis’s rights).
78. Goldstein, supra note 39, at § 8.1.3.
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counterfeit item purchases. The chargebacks occurred when customers dis-
puted the charges on their credit card. The investigations meant the payment
processors had received supporting documentation that described the coun-
terfeit item purchased and the customer’s complaint that the item was not
genuine. The chargeback documentation also included the price, which
Gucci argued was obviously not commensurate with genuine Gucci products
and therefore signaled to the payment processors that there was infringe-
ment. In addition, one of the payment processors had reviewed the counter-
feiter’s business operations as part of its initial decision to provide payment
services. This included multiple levels of review by the payment processor’s
employees, who looked at the website and its descriptions of counterfeit
items. The finding of knowledge in Gucci was not, however, cabined to the
specific knowledge of the transactions that were charged back. Instead, the
chargebacks and business review plausibly supported overall knowledge or
conscious avoidance of knowledge by the payment processors of the coun-
terfeit product sales.
The Gucci case did not proceed to a full hearing on the merits. If it had,
it may have been difficult to reconcile the finding of knowledge with another
secondary trademark infringement case decided the same year, Tiffany v.
eBay Inc.79 The Tiffany jewelry company claimed eBay was contributorily
liable for sales of counterfeit products by merchants on eBay’s website. No
knowledge was found, despite end consumer complaints to eBay about
counterfeit Tiffany items similar to the chargebacks in Gucci. The plaintiff
had sent multiple demand letters claiming at a general level that infringe-
ment was occurring and made thousands of filings to eBay indicating spe-
cific listings were counterfeit. Since eBay had removed the specific listings
and suspended repeat offenders, any knowledge on eBay’s part was not spe-
cific enough to show it knew or had reason to know counterfeit Tiffany
goods were still being sold. The most significant factual difference from
Gucci is that eBay did not review the merchant’s business before services
were offered (or at least such a review was not mentioned). This speaks to
why payment processors may be at a greater risk for knowledge; the nature
of their business often requires some diligence on the customer before ser-
vices can be extended, creating the potential for arguments that the payment
processor knew of the merchant’s infringing business.
Gucci also highlights a factor that will continue to influence the knowl-
edge of online payment processors. Thanks to developing technology for
policing transactions, it is becoming more feasible for payment processors to
know about substance of their customers’ transactions. While some online
intermediaries, like ISPs, transfer actual content, payment processors move
only funds. In the past, this could have been an advantage in arguing against
liability based on lack of knowledge; payment processors could be expected
79. Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 96.
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to have less knowledge about the legality of the items purchased in the trans-
actions processed than intermediaries who processed infringing content.
Now, the argument has less strength. Online gambling, online pharmacies,
and online cigarette sales are all subject to payment processing restrictions
based on the type of transaction.80 For example, payment processors are re-
quired to identify and block illegal-gambling transactions under the regula-
tions of the Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act.81 Even before this
legislation was passed, credit card networks used a coding/blocking system
that relied upon a merchant’s self-identified category code, “7995,” for gam-
bling, to impose geographic prohibitions on gambling transactions in order
to comply with local laws.82 To date, such knowledge is still too general for
contributory infringement liability, but it is becoming more and more tech-
nologically feasible for payment processors to determine the nature of pay-
ments on their networks. For example, one can imagine further advancement
of existing technology restricting online pharmacy purchases to identify the
drugs by brand and the merchant to flag unauthorized sellers. The ironic
result may be that as payment processors advance technology to better com-
ply with laws, they may also be increasing their risk of claims they “know”
about infringing transactions. Over the long term, a collision course is
emerging as payment processors gain more knowledge about merchant
transactions, while cases like Gucci chip away at the specificity of knowl-
edge required for secondary infringement liability. Online payment in-
termediaries are left in the middle, in an increasingly precarious position, at
risk for secondary copyright infringement claims.
c. Inducement to Infringe Copyright in Visa
Some consider inducement of copyright infringement to be a distinct
category of secondary liability, while others see it as a subcategory of con-
tributory infringement.83 The Visa case looked at inducement as an alterna-
80. See David Haskel, A Good Value Chain Gone Bad: Indirect Copyright Liability in
Perfect 10 v. Visa, 23 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 405, 432–33 (2008) (showing cooperation be-
tween credit card companies and government agencies to fight against websites selling infring-
ing or illegal content).
81. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367 (2012) (showing legislation that was directed at enforce-
ment of state and federal gambling laws, which varied by jurisdiction and were being evaded
by users through the use of online casinos).
82. Mark MacCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries Are Doing About Online Liability
and Why It Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1037, 1061–63 (2010).
83. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, supra note 39, § 8.1.3 (describing contributory infringe-
ment as long including inducement as a “separate, but sometimes overlapping, ground for
secondary liability”); Mark Bartholomew, Copyright, Trademark and Secondary Liability after
Grokster, 32 COLUM. L.J. & ARTS 445, 466 (2009) (referring to Grokster as creating a new
category of contributory copyright infringement liability); Sverker K. Hogberg, The Search for
Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909,
913 (2006) (“In declaring a new standard of ‘inducement’ liability, the Court has made it clear
that copyright law encompasses a separate, intent-based secondary liability doctrine.”).
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tive to material contribution, which, if met in conjunction with the
knowledge requirement, establishes contributory copyright infringement.
Grokster revived the inducement branch of liability and expanded the
potential for secondary copyright infringement liability by holding that “one
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.”84 Grokster explained that the critical element of inducement is the
communication of an inducing message to users, which classically involves
“advertising or solicitation . . . designed to encourage violations.”85 In Grok-
ster, the court found actual evidence of intent to induce infringement be-
cause the respondent (1) made efforts to serve former Napster users, who
were known to infringe copyright; (2) had the principal object of their
software being used to download copyrighted works, because their advertis-
ing profits increased with the use of the software for downloads; and (3)
failed to develop filtering tools to try and control copyrighted content.86
The relevant question for inducement liability in Visa was whether Visa
and MasterCard created or promoted their payment services as a means of
infringing copyright. The defendants clearly promoted the use of their cards
to pay for goods online, but the Visa majority distinguishes the defendants’
general marketing of their cards from promotion of the specific goods being
purchased. While Napster and Grokster created and promoted their software
systems explicitly for the purpose of facilitating music piracy and promoted
them as such, Visa and MasterCard were not promoting their system as a
means of breaking laws, nor were they designed to do so.
As with the analysis of “material contribution,” the majority continues
to distinguish the less culpable act of facilitating payment processing from
systems online that enable copying, altering, distributing, or displaying in-
fringing material, or even locating, viewing or downloading infringing
images. The infringing content, the majority reasons, is not available merely
from the system of payment processing. Ultimately, the majority concludes
that the conduct in Grokster and similar cases is distinguishable because the
defendants did not engage in an affirmative act or clear expression of an
intent to induce infringement.
Contrast this with the later Gucci case, where the defendant Durango’s
marketing efforts crossed the line into plausible inducement of trademark
infringement.87 Durango acted as a middleman between merchants and pay-
ment processors to set up accounts. The company’s website marketed ser-
vices specifically to “high risk merchant accounts” selling “replica”
84. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 919.
85. Id. at 937.
86. Id. 925–27.
87. Gucci Am., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
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products.88 Durango had also affirmatively acted to help the owner of
TheBagAddiction.com in efforts to reduce chargebacks from customer com-
plaints by designing a consent check box for the infringing website that re-
quired customers to acknowledge they were purchasing a “replica.” The
court found this to be a plausible affirmative step taken to foster infringe-
ment—or in the alternative that Durango promoted its payment system as a
means to infringe—and refused to dismiss the claim of inducement to in-
fringement.89 The other two payment processor defendants, although they
allegedly advertised for “high risk merchants,” were found not to have taken
sufficient affirmative steps to induce infringement. The court is not clear on
whether the inducement claims against Durango could have proceeded if it
simply advertised to high-risk merchant accounts without providing the
check-box assistance aimed at avoiding customer chargebacks.
2. Vicarious Copyright Infringement in Visa
The final type of secondary infringement considered by Visa is vicarious
copyright infringement. A defendant is liable for vicarious copyright in-
fringement if he or she has (1) the right and ability to control or super-
vise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct financial interest in the infringing
activity.90 Unlike for contributory copyright infringement, there is no knowl-
edge of the direct infringement required for vicarious infringement liability.
Each of these elements of vicarious liability have similar sounding
equivalents in the DMCA safe harbors. The safe harbor does not apply
where the intermediary has the “right and ability to control” the infringing
activity and there is a “financial benefit directly attributable” to such activ-
ity.91 As discussed above for contributory liability “knowledge,” the DMCA
safe harbors would be of limited utility if the elements of liability were the
same as the safe harbor elements—no intermediaries would qualify for vica-
rious liability protection, and direct liability is not much of a risk.92 A good
example is the ability of intermediaries to remove infringing content. If this
amounted to sufficient “control” by the intermediary to be outside the
88. Id.
89. Id. at 249.
90. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1022; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 545 U.S. at
930 (“One. . . infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to
exercise a right to stop or limit it.”).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B), (d)(2).
92. See Reese, supra note 72, at 438–442 (discussing the differences between the paral-
lel requirements for vicarious liability versus a denial of the DMCA safe harbors, and conclud-
ing that facts which “could establish a prima facie vicarious liability claim would not suffice to
remove the [online service provider] from the safe harbor and allow the claim to proceed” such
that the DMCA safe harbor provides some protection from secondary liability). To the extent
one disagrees with this position and thinks the DMCA and common law elements are the
same, then rather than asking if payment processors should be extended DMCA safe harbors,
as this paper does, the question would be whether the DMCA safe harbors should be extended
to protect any or all intermediaries from secondary copyright liability.
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DMCA protections, the notice and takedown regime of the DMCA would
not function because no liability protection would be afforded to in-
termediaries for the content that is removed.93 The DMCA removal require-
ments, thus act as a kind of minimum “floor” to what could be considered
the right and ability to control in the statutory context. When the DMCA is
not involved, there is no equivalent floor, meaning the right and ability to
control may be established more easily.
a. The Right and Ability to Control or Supervise
This element of vicarious copyright infringement requires both proof of
legal right to control the infringer and the practical ability to do so. The Visa
majority found the credit card processors did not meet the threshold for right
and ability to control at common law. The plaintiff, Perfect 10, argued the
credit card companies had sufficient control by virtue of their merchant
rules, imposed on banks and merchants by Visa and MasterCard. These rules
require investigation by member banks of suspected illegal conduct by
merchants and termination of merchant’s participation in the payment net-
work if certain illegal activity is found. The majority rejected this as estab-
lishing the right and ability to control the merchants, drawing a distinction
between the ability of credit card companies to “affect” infringement
through a refusal to process payments in contrast to the ability to directly
control the websites that reproduce, display, and distribute infringing works.
It reasoned that the payment processors could not supervise the infringing
acts on the websites of their customers and, further, have no ability to re-
move or block the infringing images. The majority draws an analogy to the
Amazon case, where Google’s terms and conditions allowed it to terminate
AdSense partnerships based on copyright violations.94 This was found insuf-
ficient to provide Google with control over direct infringement of copyright
by third-party websites because third-party infringement could continue
even if the participation in Google’s ad program was terminated.
As with the arguments on contributory infringement, the analysis con-
trasts Fonovisa and Napster, in which the focus was on the provision of
facilities and the defendant’s right to remove individual infringers from “the
very place the infringement was happening.”95 The majority also makes a
slippery slope argument, arguing software and hardware providers and even
utility companies contribute to the viability of a business but should not be
held liable for copyright infringement by that business. Like payment
processors, their refusal of service could impair the ability of the business to
93. See id. at 439.
94. Visa, 494 F.3d at 803.
95. Id. at 798, 805.
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operate, but they are not liable because they lack “sufficient control over the
actual infringing activity.”96
In his strongly worded dissent, Judge Kozinski takes the opposite posi-
tion on the significance of the terms and conditions. He finds that the pay-
ment processors have the requisite authority to stop or limit infringement by
virtue of their terms and condition of service, which expressly prohibit ille-
gal activity by merchants. He concludes that control need not constitute an
ability to completely stop the infringing conduct because the standard estab-
lished in Amazon requires only the ability to “stop or limit” the infringing
conduct.97 The Amazon test also asks whether there is a practical ability to
stop infringement, which he finds payment processors have, although there
is not an “absolute right to stop” infringement, as the majority requires. The
dissenting opinion emphasizes the correlation between risk of liability and
control; the risk disappears for more remote third parties—like the utility
companies envisaged by the majority—because they “lack the legal right to
stop the infringement.”98 He rejects the majority’s contention that payment
systems are somehow less “directly intertwined” with the infringement than
software in cases such as Napster. As in the contributory copyright infringe-
ment analysis, Judge Kozinski’s view is that payment forms an integral, in-
separable part of the infringing transaction.99
b. Financial Benefit
The second element of vicarious liability, a direct financial benefit, is
satisfied if the infringing material draws users or increases the attractiveness
of the defendant’s service.100 The benefit need not be directly correlated to
the sale of the infringing works.101 The financial benefit requirement has
been easily met in cases where vicarious liability has been imposed, such as
Napster and Fonovisa.102
Since there was no right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct
found for Visa/MasterCard, the majority in Visa declined to rule on the latter
question of whether there was a financial benefit for the credit card proces-
sors. But Judge Kozinski’s dissent observes at multiple points that the de-
96. Id. at 806.
97. Id. at 819 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
98. Id. at 821 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
99. See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
100. CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1117 (citing Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.
2004)).
101. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc.,76 F.3d at 263(finding rental of swap meet grounds to of-
fending vendors sufficient to allege direct financial benefit).
102. See also Bartholomew, supra note 39, at 452 (referencing Arista Records, Inc. v.
Flea World, Inc., No. 03–2670, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, at *41–44 (D.N.J. Mar. 31,
2006) (holding a flea market’s set fees for vendors satisfy this requirement, even though only
9% of customers at the flea market came to purchase CDs and an unknown number of them
were seeking infringing copies).
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fendants are profiting from the services they provide to infringing
websites,103 and that suggests that the fees on each payment processed for
infringing goods might satisfy the direct financial interest element.
3. Applying Secondary Copyright Infringement Analysis to PayPal
Although the Visa case provides protection for credit card companies
from secondary infringement liability, that protection is far from bulletproof
for other online payment processors. The majority’s reasoning in Visa comes
across as results-oriented. Imposing liability on Visa and MasterCard could
have brought with it broader chilling effects for online commerce, as well as
statutory damages, all of which the majority seemed striving to avoid.104 But
the net result was a dissenting opinion with much stronger reasoning, point-
ing out strained distinctions and inconsistencies with prior cases in the ma-
jority. The strength of the dissent in Visa is reinforced by its later adoption in
the Gucci case, which allowed secondary trademark infringement claims to
proceed against payment processors.
The discussion below applies both the majority and the dissent’s reason-
ing in Visa to PayPal’s business model in an analysis of contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement. It is necessarily a general analysis, and
specific facts on infringing conduct could change the conclusions. Under the
majority’s reasoning, none of the theories of secondary liability are likely to
be established, although arguments for material contribution are marginally
stronger for PayPal than for traditional payment processors.  The risk lies in
the Visa dissent’s reasoning, where factual differences in the business of
PayPal and similar payment processors leave such companies incrementally
more exposed to arguments of material contribution or vicarious copyright
infringement liability than major credit card companies. Contributory liabil-
ity still remains a stretch because PayPal lacks sufficient knowledge of the
infringing conduct of its merchants, but claims of vicarious infringement
liability are arguable. This is not to say such arguments would be successful
in court, but, rather, to point out the difference in risk levels and to illustrate
the potential for claims by rights holders. This higher risk is exacerbated by
the broader legislative and industry trends seeking to involve payment
processors in policing online copyright, as discussed in the following sec-
tions of this article.
103. Visa, 494 F.3d at 816 (2007) (Kozinski, J. dissenting) (stating that the defendants
“know about the infringements; they profit from them”); id. at 810 (acknowledging Perfect
10s’ arguments that the “defendants do not want to lose the substantial revenues and profits
they receive from the websites”).
104. Bridy, supra note 4, at 1538–39.
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a. Applying Contributory Copyright Infringement Analysis to PayPal
This Section considers how the analysis of material contribution, in-
ducement, and knowledge might apply to PayPal in assessing claims of con-
tributory copyright infringement.
i. PayPal’s Risk of Materially Contributing to Copyright
Infringement by Users
PayPal and eBay were part of the same company for thirteen years, until
the spinoff of PayPal in 2015. This is significant because together the com-
panies created previously unavailable opportunities for small online sellers
and buyers.105 PayPal gained its initial traction by focusing on small custom-
ers, and the company’s fortunes rose along with eBay’s.106 PayPal has grown
exponentially, and processed a total payment volume of approximately $354
billion globally in 2016.107 Although PayPal has since split from eBay, these
“micro merchants” continue to drive PayPal’s business today.108 In 2016,
PayPal processed an average of only thirty-one payments for each active
customer.109
PayPal offers two key payment functions: the ability to pay via the
PayPal feature itself and the ability to accept credit card payments. For the
latter, PayPal itself acts as the merchant of record with Visa and MasterCard
on behalf of its customers, rather than each of those merchants having a
direct account with Visa or MasterCard. Although oversimplifying some-
105. THOMAS EISENMANN AND LAUREN BARLEY, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL CASE
STUDY, PAYPAL MERCHANT SERVICES 1 (Mar. 13, 2007) (approximately 78% of the transac-
tions on eBay were processed using PayPal around 2007); see also Vauhini Vara, Why eBay
and PayPal Broke Up, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 1, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/business/
currency/ebay-paypal-broke (early in PayPal’s business lifecycle, eBay also accounted for
most of PayPal’s transactions, but this has faded to around 30%).
106. See Will Morton, Check It Out: The Web is suddenly crowded with online-payment
services; Here’s how they compare, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2001, at R13 (“The business of
online money transfers between individuals grew out of the Internet auction phenomenon,
which brought small sellers and buyers onto the Web and created demand for a quick, reliable
way to make payments and get the merchandise sent.”).
107. PayPal Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 41 (Feb. 8, 2017).
108. Letter from PayPal, to J. Johnson, Secretary, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Re: Regulation II, Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing; Docket No. R-1404 (Feb.
22, 2011) (“PayPal enables a variety of micro merchants to more easily accept payments by
providing them with various value-added services, including underwriting the risk of transac-
tion reversals (such as those from consumer disputes) and refunds.”); Letter from PayPal to
Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Re:
Proposed rules regarding global remittance services, July 22, 2011, http://www.federalreserve
.gov/secrs/2011/july/20110729/r-1419/r1419_072211_83811_470495842711_1.pdf (indicat-
ing that although PayPal enables peer to peer money transfers, more than 94% of the payments
that PayPal processes are for commercial purposes, at least as of 2011. This statistic may
change as PayPal increasingly moves into the peer-to-peer payments space, such as through its
2013 acquisition of the payment app Venmo).
109. Supra note 107 at 41.
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what, PayPal essentially offers the service of allowing merchants to use
PayPal’s central-merchant account to accept credit card payments for the
merchant’s business.110 PayPal therefore enables online payments for sellers
who cannot qualify for credit card merchant accounts directly111 or who do
not want to jump through the hoops to obtain their own accounts. PayPal
pioneered this “merchant of record” business model for credit card pay-
ments, which has since become popular among other online payment
services.
PayPal was essential in the proliferation of small online sellers on plat-
forms like eBay because it solved the most intractable barrier to online trans-
actions between strangers—a lack of trust. Traditional payment methods
such as cash or checks demand that one party, usually the customer, vest
their trust in the other, sending payment in hopes that the goods would ar-
rive, and be of the promised quality. These payment methods offered little or
no security for the provided payment information. There was minimal ability
to claw-back funds if the products were not delivered or not as advertised.
PayPal’s intervention was revolutionary because it greatly reduced this trust
problem by acting as an escrow agent. PayPal accepts payment from the
consumer and then relays that payment to the merchant for a fee. The
merchant does not receive the customer’s payment details. This enabled
transactions to be carried out with confidence, even if the seller and buyer
were unknown to each other, because PayPal added both security and con-
trol over funds. Even now, PayPal advertises its “Purchase Protection” as a
consumer-facing sales feature, which provides the buyer with a refund if the
transaction goes awry.112
PayPal’s appeal to small merchants also stems from its lower cost than
credit card payment processing. PayPal charges the same fees regardless of
who the customer is or what mode of payment is used. Traditional merchant
credit card services vary the fees charged to merchants significantly based
on the card used by the customer, and merchants are required to accept all
cards regardless of the fee imposed. PayPal offers lower, more consistent
fees than credit cards do, and this is a central aspect of PayPal’s promotion
110. See, e.g., PayPal Accept Credit Cards Online, https://www.paypal.com/webapps/
mpp/accept-credit-cards (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
111. Katy Jacob et al., Payments Pricing, Who Bears the Cost?: A Conference Summary,
CHICAGO FED. LETTER number 266a, at 5 (Sept. 1, 2009) (“[P]ayPal also provides smaller
merchants that cannot get merchant accounts at banks access to electronic payments
systems.”).
112. See, e.g., PayPal Purchase Protection, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/
paypal-safety-and-security (last visited Sept. 13, 2016) (“[W]e protect you from checkout to
delivery and use the latest anti-fraud technology to help spot problems before they happen. We
never reveal your financial info to sellers. And if something goes wrong with an order, we’ll
investigate. If your transaction qualifies for Purchase Protection, we’ll reimburse you for the
full purchase price plus any original shipping costs.”).
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to small merchants.113 As a result, PayPal’s business is driven by many small
customers seeking this value, more so than Visa’s or MasterCard’s.
Although smaller merchants are not necessarily infringing merchants,
PayPal’s partner, eBay, has known infringement problems amongst its
merchants. For example, in a prominent case involving the sale of Tiffany
jewelry on eBay, more counterfeit jewelry than authentic jewelry was found
on the website.114 Since PayPal and eBay services are historically inter-
twined, similar infringing conduct among PayPal’s merchants could easily
exist. Although far from conclusive, an initial case search also turned up
multiple anecdotal examples of copyright infringement claims against small
merchants using PayPal accounts for their allegedly infringing transac-
tions.115 The instances of infringing conduct among PayPal customers more
broadly, particularly in comparison to more traditional payment methods,
would be an interesting area of further study. It may also be that infringing
merchants are more likely to be smaller merchants because building a suc-
cessful, large scale business based on infringement is difficult in the face of
active copyright enforcement.
PayPal’s integral role in the viability of many of its small merchant’s
businesses provides a stronger argument that PayPal supplies the “facilities”
for the infringement, at least relative to the role of major credit card compa-
nies. The majority in Visa concluded that because “other viable funding
mechanisms are available,” infringement could continue on a wide scale
even if Visa and MasterCard were not involved (and therefore the card com-
panies had not materially contributed). This seems less accurate for many of
PayPal’s merchants. Although there are more alternative online payment op-
tions now than at the time of the Visa case, PayPal remains by far the most
popular, trusted, and established. At least compared to merchants who are
qualified to obtain Visa or MasterCard accounts, like those in the Visa case,
it seems likely that PayPal’s merchants have fewer viable funding mecha-
nisms. Based on the Visa majority, that makes arguments that PayPal is sup-
plying a form of “facilities” to its merchants more likely.
PayPal would likely be found to be a material contributor to infringe-
ment under Judge Kozinski’s dissent. This reasoning rejects the analysis of
113. See, e.g., Why PayPal?, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/brc/why-paypal
(last visited Sept. 13, 2016) (promoting lower PayPal fees (2.9% of the total transaction, plus
$0.30 per transaction) compared to traditional merchant card services fees. PayPal also claims
it reduces payment processing costs because there are fewer chargebacks, less fraud, and fewer
customer complaints than with traditional credit card processing services.).
114. Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 97–98 (referencing a study by Tiffany that found
75.5% of test purchases on eBay were counterfeit jewelry. Although the court questioned the
methodology of this finding, it agreed that a “significant portion of the ‘Tiffany’ sterling silver
jewelry listed on the eBay website . . . was counterfeit”).
115. See, e.g., Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Ishayev, 9 F. Supp. 3d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Tory
Burch Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Doe, No. 12 C 7163, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142554 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2,
2012).
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the number of alternative means to infringe as irrelevant in determining ma-
teriality of the contribution to infringement, which can always be carried out
some other way. Instead the question is whether PayPal “substantially as-
sists” in the infringement. The dissent views involvement in payment for
infringing works as direct involvement in the infringement. On this reason-
ing, PayPal’s enabling payment for infringing goods would be a material
contribution. And there is an argument that PayPal provides more substantial
assistance to its merchants’ infringing transactions than Visa or MasterCard,
for the same reasons explained above; PayPal is not merely tangential to
enabling the businesses of its small merchants, as they might not be
merchants at all but for the pioneering PayPal business model. If the Visa
dissent’s approach signals the direction of future law, as the adoption in
Gucci might suggest, then online payment processors face an increasing risk
of contributory copyright liability.
ii. PayPal’s Potential Knowledge of Direct Infringement
As with other payment processors, PayPal likely has general knowledge
of the type of transactions it is processing, some knowledge of the nature of
its vendors’ businesses, and some more specific knowledge of transactions
charged back through PayPal’s purchase-protection services. Although in-
formation on the type of transaction reflects a certain level of factual
“knowledge,” it falls short of the high level of specificity that has been re-
quired for liability in past contributory copyright infringement cases. Most
cases have held that a general knowledge that one’s service could be used to
infringe copyright, or even that it is generally being used to do so, is not
sufficient for contributory liability.
However, if the more relaxed Gucci approach to “knowledge” was ap-
plied in copyright law, PayPal could well be found to have knowledge of
direct infringement. The Gucci case found plausible knowledge based on
routine actions like merchant vetting before account opening and customer
complaints resulting in chargebacks. As in Gucci, whether PayPal had suffi-
cient knowledge would depend on the facts, such as how closely PayPal
looks at its merchant’s businesses before providing them with services.
Gucci illustrates the factual differences in the roles of various payment
intermediaries that influence their level of knowledge. Although this paper
often discusses payment processors generally, their roles vary widely. Visa
and MasterCard generally do not have direct merchant contact; they interact
with banks in an authorization, clearing, and settlement role.116 In contrast,
acquirers—meaning the banks and other parties who bring merchants into
card networks (as in Gucci)—vet merchants and see chargebacks. The po-
116. For a helpful and detailed discussion of the distinctions between the parties involved
in payment processing, see Kelly K. Yang, Paying for Infringement: Implicating Credit Card
Networks in Secondary Trademark Liability, 26 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 687 (2011).
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tential implications of this distinction are emerging in the cases canvassed
above; Visa and MasterCard, who have more remote relationships with
merchants, were not liable for secondary infringement in Visa, whereas a
plausible case was made out in Gucci against the payment intermediaries
who interacted more closely with the merchants.
Online payment processors like PayPal fall somewhere in between. The
application for PayPal merchant services requires the business to be de-
scribed by type and category, but it is not clear what additional vetting of
merchants occurs after that stage. If cases like Gucci signal increasing likeli-
hood of knowledge being found for online payment processors, then the
higher bar for knowledge under a DMCA-like system looks preferable for
payment processors. It would reduce their risk of being found to have
knowledge sufficient for secondary liability through routine conduct like that
in Gucci.
iii. Applying the Inducement to Infringe Analysis to PayPal
The inducement branch of contributory copyright infringement seems
unlikely to be a strong argument against PayPal’s business. The cumulative
result of the inducement cases is a somewhat blurry scale, from software
systems promoted for the purpose of piracy in Grokster, to the facilitation of
high-risk payment accounts in Gucci, to the marketing of credit cards as a
means of paying for goods online in Visa which did not constitute induce-
ment. On this scale, it would be hard to argue that PayPal’s system was
designed for the explicit purpose of facilitating infringement, as the court
found for Grokster. And, while Grokster’s inducement was based in part on
its failure to create tools to filter infringing content, PayPal has actively de-
veloped filtering and control tools and, in some cases, has chosen to block
categories of transactions in an effort to reduce infringement.117
Grokster’s liability was also based on its efforts to target customers
known to be infringers because they used a prior infringing service, Napster.
Not all Napster users were infringing, but many were known to be. A ver-
sion of this argument could be applied to PayPal, whose bread and butter is
smaller, online customers who may not be able to obtain a Visa or Master-
Card account. PayPal certainly targets small, online merchants in its adver-
tising. Not all PayPal users are infringing, but existing cases and the history
with eBay suggests some proportion are, so PayPal’s advertisements to small
users could be seen as targeting infringing users. Although such arguments
might be made, they stretch the logic in Grokster too far. PayPal’s customer
base is not a known group of predominantly infringing users like Grokster’s
117. See, e.g., Pincent Masons, PayPal Terms Require File-Sharing Operators to Let It
Monitor for Pirate Content, OUT-LAW.COM, http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/july/pay
pal-terms-require-file-sharing-operators-to-let-it-monitor-for-pirate-content/ (July 12, 2012);
See also the discussion on PayPal’s block with respect to VPN services, below.
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was—they are a largely uncharacterized group with a likely larger propor-
tion of legitimate users. PayPal can distinguish the Grokster case by arguing
it is advertising merely to small customers, not infringing customers, and
equating between the two is an unsubstantiated generalization.
As with Visa’s reasoning applied to Visa and MasterCard’s general pro-
motion of their payment services, it is more likely that PayPal’s general
promotion to small merchants does not amount to inducing infringement.
Inducement would require more specific instances of advertising by PayPal
for the use of its products in infringement. PayPal has certainly stopped short
of marketing specifically to “replica” companies like Durango did in the
Gucci case. A finding of inducement to infringe for PayPal based on the
reasoning in Visa therefore seems unlikely.
b. Applying Vicarious Copyright Infringement Analysis to PayPal
PayPal likely meets the element of direct financial benefit required to
find vicarious infringement of copyright through its merchants. When in-
fringing goods are purchased by end consumers from its merchants, PayPal
earns a fee directly from the merchant on that transaction. The more difficult
question is whether PayPal meets the second element of vicarious copyright
infringement, which would require PayPal to have the right and ability to
control its merchant’s infringement of copyright.
Under the majority’s reasoning in Visa on the right and ability to con-
trol, PayPal is unlikely to face vicarious copyright infringement liability be-
cause, like the credit card defendants, it lacks sufficient control over
merchant conduct. PayPal cannot remove websites from the Internet or block
the distribution of their content. PayPal may, as discussed in the contributory
copyright infringement analysis above, have a greater ability to exert finan-
cial pressure on its merchants than credit card companies, based on the as-
sumption that more PayPal merchants lack alternative payment methods. But
Visa dictates that PayPal’s ability to affect merchant payments in such a
manner is insufficient to constitute direct control over the acts of reproduc-
tion, alteration, and distribution of copyrighted content by such merchants.
The “control and supervise” element of vicarious liability would not be met.
However, PayPal would face a greater risk of vicarious liability for cop-
yright infringement than major credit card companies under the reasoning in
Judge Kozinski’s dissent. First, at the outset of his evaluation of whether
there is “control,” Judge Kozinski observes that blocking the ability to ac-
cept credit cards would be a “heavy blow” to the websites because of the
escrow agent role that credit cards play in ensuring customers can reverse
the transaction if the goods are not satisfactory. This argument has even
greater force for PayPal, whose escrow function is central to its value pro-
position. PayPal’s popularity in online transactions stems from the trust it
created as an escrow agent for online auction payments when a lack of rela-
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tionship or payment recourse between buyers and sellers would otherwise
have precluded the transaction. PayPal’s escrow agent role is central to facil-
itating the business of its customers, even more so than the credit cards at
issue in Visa.
Second, Judge Kozinski found that the Visa and MasterCard terms of
service gave them authority to control infringing sales by merchants.118 The
rules permitted the credit card companies to require member merchants to
cease illegal activity—such as copyright infringement—as a condition of
continuing right to receive credit card payments from the defendants.119 Cut-
ting off the payment services in such a manner would stop or limit the direct
infringement. Similarly, PayPal’s User Agreement expressly grants PayPal
the right, in its sole discretion, to terminate account access if a user engages
in “restricted activities.” Such activities include violation of any law and,
more specifically, “sell[ing] counterfeit goods.”120 Even though PayPal does
not have physical control over the infringing goods sold, the company has
the direct ability to terminate infringer’s accounts, which satisfies the control
element under the reasoning of Judge Kozinski’s dissent.
Judge Kozinski’s approach could backfire in the absence of an infringe-
ment safe harbor for online payment processors. If payment processors face
liability for merchant actions because their terms of use prohibit infringing
conduct, the simplest solution, in theory, is to delete the contractual clause
providing that control. This would be an extreme measure in practice, but
not every intermediary is necessarily a good corporate citizen. Under Judge
Kozinski’s analysis, such deletion would relieve the payment processor of
vicarious liability risk because the company would no longer have the direct
legal ability to control the infringing conduct of its users. Judge Kozinski
does not address this theoretical impact in his dissent. The DMCA safe
harbors offer a means of guarding against this scenario by encouraging
good-faith take-down by intermediaries without imposing liability for secon-
dary infringement.
B. Legislative Leanings Toward Payment Processor Enforcement Online
By 2011, policy recommendations and proposed legislation had begun
pushing toward a greater role for payment processors in fighting online in-
fringement. The Registrar of Copyrights, an American Bar Association
(ABA) report, and the failed Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and its Senate
counterpart the Protect IP Act (PIPA) have all proposed increased obliga-
118. Id., at 817.
119. Id., at 816.
120. PayPal User Agreement, (effective as of July 27, 2017), https://www.paypal.com/
webapps/mpp/ua/useragreement-full#9 (restricting the sale of counterfeit goods and permitting
the termination if restricted activities are engaged in).
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tions on payment processors to deny services to merchants with copyright
infringing websites.
The Registrar of Copyrights, the director of the U.S. Copyright Office,
lamented the proliferation of “rogue” foreign websites violating IP rights
beyond the reach of the U.S.121 In the same statement before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, she advocated for a “follow the money” ap-
proach that cuts off U.S. payment mechanisms and advertising of infringing
foreign sites.122 The Registrar argued that cutting off payment methods was
an efficient and effective means of depriving such websites of customers,
particularly because consumers are suspicious of websites that do not accept
standard payment types.123
Similarly, the ABA’s Intellectual Property Section issued a report in
2014 that encouraged Congress to enact more effective laws to deter online
piracy and counterfeiting by foreign websites.124 The ABA called for legisla-
tion enabling orders to be made against financial service providers to freeze
customer funds obtained by “counterfeiting” websites.125 Financial-service
providers have responded to calls for such legislation by requesting safe
harbors to protect against wrongful interference claims by the targeted
websites.126
The ABA argues payment processors are well-positioned intermediaries
to freeze funds because of their existing fraud-detection systems.127 The re-
port references four recent cases where asset-freezing orders have been is-
sued against payment processors by U.S. District Courts.128 Interestingly, at
least two of these cases involved orders to freeze PayPal accounts, but none
121. Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Para-
sites, Parts I & II: Hearing on H.R.112-153 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcom-
mittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet, 112th Cong. 1, 18 (2011)
(written statement of Maria A. Pallante, Acting Register of Copyrights), https://judiciary.house
.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-153_65186.pdf.
122. Id. at 19–25; 108 (suggesting that legislation be enacted allowing customs enforce-
ment agencies to request a court order that requires payment processors, including “credit card
companies and payment intermediaries such as PayPal,” to stop providing services for rogue
website to consumers in the U.S.).
123. Id. at 24.
124. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, A Section
White Paper: A Call for Action for Online Piracy and Counterfeiting Legislation (2014), at ix
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_property_law/advo-
cacy/ABASectionWhitePaperACallForActionCompositetosize.authcheckdam.pdf.
125. Id. at 27–28.
126. Id. at 28.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 27 (referring to True Religion v. Xiaokang Lei, No. 11-cv-8242 (HB), at 10
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (temporary restraining order); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Jiang, No. 11-cv-
24049, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142630, at *9 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (preliminary injunction); Deck-
ers Outdoor Corp v. Doe, No. 11 C 10, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119448, at *15–*19 (ND. Ill.
2011) (default judgment); and Hermès Int’l et al. v. John Doe et al., No. 12 Civ. 1623, at 6–7
(S.D.N.Y.  2012) (default judgment and permanent injunction)).
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of the orders were against traditional credit card processors.129 One possible
explanation for PayPal being a more popular target for such orders is that
PayPal users can maintain a balance with the company. That balance can be
targeted by freezing orders while transaction-by-transaction payment
processing cannot. Another possible explanation is that PayPal’s merchants
are more likely to offer infringing goods that make such orders necessary.
The contentious Stop Online Piracy Act, and its Senate counterpart the
Protect IP Act, also proposed that payment processors be required to cease
providing services to blacklisted infringing websites.130 The pair of bills
were proposed by a coalition of intellectual property rights advocates, in-
cluding the strong motion picture and sound recording lobbies.131 The head-
line news was the intense opposition to the bills by advocates of freedom of
expression and the open Internet, who were concerned about over-broad
remedies that would allow for the removal of large amounts of non-infring-
ing online content.132 The unprecedented opposition meant these bills were
abandoned before they were brought forward for the necessary votes.133 The
headline-capturing, big-picture issues also meant the payment processor pro-
visions in the same bills remained largely under the radar.
SOPA proposed a new notice and blocking regime targeted at “black-
listed” domains involved in intellectual property infringement, provocatively
labeled as Internet sites “dedicated to theft of U.S. property.”134 Advertising
networks and payment processors, upon notice, would be required to take
“technically feasible and reasonable measures” to cut off payment process-
ing for such sites for any transaction involving customers located in the
U.S.135 Like DMCA notices, the SOPA/PIPA notices include a statement
that the holder of the intellectual property right has a good faith belief that
the use is not authorized, including by law.136 The bills also contemplated a
129. Hermès Int’l et al. v. John Doe et al., No. 12 Civ. 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); True
Religion v. Xiaokang Lei, No. 11 Civ. 8242 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
130. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); Protect
Intellectual Property Act (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). The predecessor bill to PIPA
was the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA), S. 3804, 111th Cong.
(2010).
131. Bridy, supra note 4 at 1540.
132. See, e.g., SOPA/PIPA: Internet Blacklist Legislation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUN-
DATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/coica-internet-censorship-and-copyright-bill (last visited
October 14, 2017); see also, Bridy, supra note 4, at 1540–41. (recounting the dramatic re-
sponses to Wikipedia and other significant websites going “dark” for one day in protest,
prompting unprecedented numbers of people to contact their Congressional and Senate repre-
sentative to express opposition to the bills).
133. Andrew P. Bridges, SOPA Didn’t Die. It Just Became Soft SOPA., Intellectual
Property Bulletin Summer 2013, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.fenwick
.com/Publications/Pages/Intellectual-Property-Bulletin-Summer-2013.aspx#Sopa.
134. Stop Online Piracy Act § 103.
135. Id. at § 103(b)(1). The provisions related to payment processors were fairly similar
in SOPA and PIPA. See Bridy, supra note 4, at 1542.
136. Stop Online Piracy Act § 103(b)(4)(A).
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counter-notice regime under which the targeted domain holder could dispute
the initial notice. Upon receipt of such a counter-notice, the payment proces-
sor need not take further action until the complaining party obtains and
serves the processor with a court order against the domain.137 Once the court
order is served, the payment processor is again obligated to cut off services
to the website or else they themselves can be made the subject of an order to
comply.138 A knowing and willful failure to comply with the order against
the payment processor can result in monetary damages. Payment processors
who comply with notices or orders are protected from litigation arising from
actions to reasonably comply with the proposed legislation and from actions
by users to circumvent access restrictions on foreign sites.139
The proposed SOPA regime placed payment processors front and center
in battling online infringement. It weighed the balance heavily in favor of
blocking payment because, unlike the opt-in DMCA scheme, it provides for
orders and even monetary damages against payment processors who refuse
to block services. Interestingly, payment processors were split on their sup-
port or opposition to SOPA; Visa and MasterCard ultimately expressed sup-
port,140 while PayPal opposed the bills.
The opposition to SOPA and PIPA’s other provisions was rooted in con-
cern over blocking of non-infringing content hosted on the same servers as
infringing content, potentially violating freedom of expression rights. The
same criticism of over-broadness can be levied at the payment processor
provisions. The liability protection for processors is contingent on entirely
blocking payments to websites that are blacklisted. Yet the legislation im-
plies the blocks can apply to much more than websites that directly infringe
by using waffle words like “engages in, enables, or facilitates” infringement
and “other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”141 This casts a net
broad enough to catch sites with a mixture of legal and illegal content. One
notice of one instance of infringement could mean the loss of all payment
services, preventing transactions for non-infringing content, and even block-
ing payments for non-infringing but “facilitating” websites.
137. See Pallante, supra note 121.
138. Stop Online Piracy Act §§ 103(d)(2)(A)(i), 103(d)(4)(B).
139. Id. § 103(d)(5).
140. See Stop Online Piracy Act: Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 82–83, 91 (2011) (statement of Linda Kirkpatrick, Group Head, Cus-
tomer Performance Integrity, Mastercard Worldwide); List of Supporters and Opponents of
H.R. 3261, OPENCONGRESS, https://www.opencongress.org/bill/hr3261-112/bill_positions
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160228085636/https://www.opencongress.org/bill/hr3261-112/
bill_positions] (listing PayPal in opposition and Visa in support).
141. Stop Online Piracy Act § 103(a)(1) (defining the phrase “Internet site is dedicated to
theft of U.S. property”).
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C. Payment Processors “Voluntarily” Police Copyright Infringement
This Section considers the implications of the recent agreement among
payment processors to centrally and voluntarily block payment processing
for allegedly infringing merchants, and the unilateral blocking of services by
payment processors and other intermediaries.
1. The Payment Processor Agreement: Few Merchant Rights, Weak
Payment Processor Liability Protections
Although SOPA and PIPA died as bills, their shadow hung heavy over
payment processors. The threat of SOPA/PIPA-like legislation is credited
with driving an industry-wide “voluntary” best practices agreement among
payment processors to facilitate denials of service for copyright infringing
websites.142 In June 2011, an agreement on best practices was reached be-
tween all of the major payment processors: American Express, Discover,
MasterCard, PayPal, Visa, and approximately thirty-one rights holders (the
“Payment Processor Agreement”).143 The parties agreed to abide by best
practices to “stop sites distributing counterfeit and pirated goods from con-
ducting financial transactions through payment processors.”144
Whether the Payment Processor Agreement was truly “voluntary” has
been called into question, with one author labeling it “non-regulatory regula-
tion.”145 Although the agreement is technically voluntary, all major payment
processors agreed to it under threat of SOPA/PIPA. In the words of one
Congressman, SOPA/PIPA focused a spotlight on intermediaries and
“helped motivate an important shift in the willingness of some parties to
engage more aggressively in negotiating to develop some of the best prac-
tices” in online copyright infringement.146 It was “highly encouraged and
142. Bridy, supra note 4, at 1543 (describing how the online intermediaries that would
have been subject to SOPA/PIPA instead implemented voluntary blocking agreements, under
the pressure of the IPEC).
143. U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENF’T COORDINATOR, 2011 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCE-
MENT 46 (2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annu
al_2011_report-new.pdf [hereinafter IPEC 2011 ANNUAL REPORT] (indicating an agreement
had been reached between the above-mentioned parties in June 2011); INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING COALITION, BEST PRACTICES TO ADDRESS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND
THE SALE OF COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS ON THE INTERNET, (on file with the author, courtesy of
Professor Annemarie Bridy) (“Payment Processor Agreement”). The June 2011 agreement
does not appear to be publicly available.
144. IPEC 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 143, at 46. Other payment processors such
as MoneyGram, PULSE and Western Union have since signed on to the agreement.
145. Bridy, supra note 4 at 1543.
146. Role of Voluntary Agreements in the U.S. Intellectual Property System: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of Rep. Mel Watt, Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/113-49-82846.pdf. See
House Judiciary Committee hearings on copyright reform, supra note 10 (raising the question
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supported” by the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), an
office of the White House established in 2009 that convenes and participates
in the negotiations of such agreements.147 The Administration, through
IPEC, has long taken the position that payment processors and other in-
termediaries should voluntarily engage in steps to support copyright hold-
ers.148 If the industry chooses not to collaborate with IPEC, the agency can
make recommendations on further legislative measures,149 leaving little
choice for industry participants but to improve their policing of infringement
online.
The Payment Processor Agreement sets out high-level best practices for
payment processors to address copyright infringement and counterfeit prod-
uct sales online.150 The Agreement provides for rights holders to file com-
plaints about infringing sites in order to have payment processing blocked.
The complaint must include a description of the infringement, including the
website and evidence proving the allegation, evidence of ownership of the
intellectual property in question, and evidence that the payment processor’s
services could theoretically be used to buy the infringing product.151 Similar
to the DMCA notice regime, the notice contains an attestation from the
rights owner that, to the best of their knowledge, the use of the intellectual
property by the website is not authorized by license or the law.152 Each pay-
ment processor can determine the specifics of their own process within these
general best practices.
Payment processors and the governmental International An-
tiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) started a central, online portal called
“Rogue Block” to facilitate rights holders’ complaints to payment processors
in conjunction with the Payment Processor Agreement.153 Since its com-
again as to whether Congress should create incentives for voluntary systems to address
infringement).
147. IACC, Rogue Block, IACC.ORG, http://www.iacc.org/online-initiatives/rogueblock
(last visited September 19, 2016). By 2013, IPEC had “facilitated” several agreements includ-
ing the payment processor agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding between broadband
providers and rights owners and pledges from advertiser networks for online best practices.
148. Bridy, supra note 4 at 1543–44 (tracing the increasingly specific statements about
IPEC encouraging payment processor voluntary participation in site-blocking).
149. Id. at 1545.
150. The terms are imposed, where relevant, on merchant acquirers as well, through their
terms of service with the participating payment processors.
151. Payment Processor Agreement, supra note 144, sec. 3; KRISTINA MONTANARO,
INT’L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OCTOBER 2012: IACC PAY-
MENT PROCESSOR PORTAL PROGRAM – FIRST YEAR REVIEW (2013) (describing the Payment
Processor Agreement/Rogue Block operation and including an example notice). The IACC
role in the scheme is to review the complaints for completeness, then sends them on to the
relevant payment processor(s).
152. Payment Processor Agreement, supra note 143, sec. 3(c); IACC Executive Sum-
mary (2013), supra note 151 at 5. Alternatively, the rights holder can provide a DMCA notice
or a cease and desist letter.
153. See generally Int’l AntiCounterfeiting Coalition Rogue Block, supra note 147.
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mencement in early 2012, Rogue Block has resulted in the termination of
over 5,000 merchant accounts, impacting over 200,000 websites.154 This
number would likely be higher but for the program’s limit of twenty-five
complaints per rights holder per month.155
The Payment Processor Agreement has some major flaws from the per-
spective of merchants, including procedural and substantive issues that
heighten the risk of over-blocking legitimate commerce. Procedurally, after
a complaint is filed, it is not clear exactly what notice is required to be given
to the subject merchant. However, the Payment Processor Agreement indi-
cates that the merchant may contest the claim by providing written evidence
that it has the right to sell the allegedly infringing product.156 Statistics sug-
gest these “counter” notices are rare; none were received in the first year of
operation,157 and by the second year, only four had been received, amounting
to a response rate of 0.05% of all notices issued.158 This could be interpreted
multiple ways. Perhaps merchants are not disputing complaints because they
are not aware of their option to do so, or because of a sense that the power of
rights holders and payment processors make such efforts futile.  Alterna-
tively, these statistics could indicate that most Rogue Block requests are
justified, because the target merchant cannot provide counter-notice evi-
dence of their non-infringement.
Substantively, the blocking decision also seems potentially unfair to
merchants. The determinative factor in the payment block is the investiga-
tion by the payment processor and whether in its reasonable opinion the
merchant is violating intellectual property rights. There is no indication of
the extent or nature of the investigation required of the payment processor.
Nor is there a statement on the factors that might be determinative in draw-
ing the infringement conclusion. If the payment processor is of the opinion
that there is a violation, an initial demand is made to the merchant to cease
selling infringing products.159 If the merchant persists after the warning, the
payment processing services must be suspended or terminated for U.S. buy-
ers.160 The voluntary agreement is light on details for remedial action by
merchants who are wrongly sanctioned, and any appeal by the merchant of
the decision is to the same payment processor.161
154. See Id.
155. The limit was intended to reduce the burden on the IACC, which acts as an interme-
diary for the program’s notices.
156. Payment Processor Agreement, supra note 143 at sec. 6.
157. IACC Executive Summary (2013), supra note 151 at 12.
158. IACC 2013 Highlights Report at 2, (indicating 4 of 8,000 notices were challenged)
(on file with author, previously available at http://www.gacg.org/Content/Upload/Member
NewsDocs/IACC_2013_YearInReview.pdf).
159. Payment Processor Agreement, supra note 14 at sec. 7 (warning).
160. Id. at sec. 8 (indicating payment “shall” be suspended or terminated, non-voluntary).
161. Bridy, supra note 4 at 1561.
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Even worse, if the payment processor does not think the website is in-
fringing, the agreement contemplates that payment services could still be
blocked.162 If the payment processor finds that the merchant provided credi-
ble evidence of non-infringement, the payment processor can then request
indemnity from the rights holder and proceed with the block anyway.163 This
gives rights holders significant control over the incentives for blocking and
tilts the system in favor of payment processors refusing services to
merchants. A denial of payment services to the merchant prevents the sale of
all of their products. The result is potential over-blocking, where service is
denied to a merchant with a site that contains both infringing and non-in-
fringing content or even predominantly non-infringing content. In fact, the
Payment Processor Agreement contemplates on its face that websites could
contain both infringing and non-infringing goods for sale.164
The operation of the Rogue Block system creates the potential for over-
blocking in two further ways. First, the rights holder complaint requires the
inclusion of merely “a representative” infringing product.165 The payment
processor does not appear to receive information about the proportion of
legal or illegal transactions processed by the merchant that is the subject of a
blocking request. Second, the Rogue Block system distributes notices re-
questing a denial of payment services to all relevant payment processors.166
This would be roughly equivalent to a centralized DMCA system where no-
tice is given once by the rights holder, but channeled out to prompt action by
all ISPs and other online service providers, instead of requiring separate no-
tice to each of these intermediary as the DMCA currently does. Since all
major payment processors participate in the system, the centralization makes
it more likely the merchant site will be completely shut down, as all of its
payment alternatives are blocked. These factors in the voluntary system
make over-blocking likely and weigh the system in favor of rights holders.
In contrast to the Payment Processor Agreement, the DMCA regime has
at least two features that are beneficial for merchants. First, at least in the-
ory, it channels two-sided disputes into the hands of the judiciary. A DMCA
counter notice results in “put back” of the content that was removed, unless
and until the complaining rights holder brings legal action to prevent what it
sees as infringing activity.167 This triggers judicial oversight where there is a
counter notice, which increases the likelihood that merchant/user rights are
taken into account. The benefit of such oversight is evident in recent cases
162. Payment Processor Agreement, supra note 14 at sec. 11; Bridy, supra note 4 at
1561.
163. Payment Processor Agreement, supra note 14 at sec. 11.
164. Id. at sec. 3(a) (“[i]f only certain items on a website are alleged to be Illegitimate
Products. . .”).
165. IACC Executive Summary, supra note 151, at 5.
166. Id. at 6.
167. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (g)(2)(C).
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that have recognized user rights in the DMCA context, such as the require-
ment that copyright holders consider whether the fair use doctrine permits
the use of material the copyright holder otherwise would seek to remove
through a takedown notice.168 Second, on the rare occasions when a
merchant challenges a block under the Payment Processor Agreement, there
is no indication that their services are restored while the dispute is pending
in a manner akin to the DMCA’s “put back.” Since a payment block could
stop the merchant’s business from functioning entirely, restoration of ser-
vices while determining whether the merchant is infringing is significant.
Although the DMCA faces criticism about over-takedown and a failure to
protect user rights, it still seems like an improvement over the system of the
Payment Processor Agreement.
The Payment Processor Agreement seems to have downsides for pay-
ment processors as well. There remains some discretion for companies par-
ticipating in the Payment Processor Agreement since it is framed only as
“best practices,” and ultimately each payment processor can design their
own investigation and response systems.169 However, under those best prac-
tices, the denial of payment services is termed as mandatory rather than
voluntary if the merchant persists in allegedly infringing sales after an initial
warning.170 This is a major difference from the DMCA, where the intermedi-
ary may choose not to respond to a takedown notice and take the chance that
it may or may not face secondary liability claims. In contrast, the DMCA
regime does not impose an affirmative duty on the intermediary to block
infringing content.
The Payment Processor Agreement seems to leave payment processors
in an awkward position in which they assume enforcement costs and respon-
sibilities without robust protection from liability. Payment processors are in-
curring the costs and burdens of a notice and blocking regime in a manner
that looks similar to the DMCA system, yet are stuck in a liability sandwich
between rights holders and merchants. If rights holders are unsatisfied by the
payment processors response to a block request, there is no guarantee of
liability protection unless the rights holders waive their right to sue by agree-
ment. Such contractual protection seems contingent on the rights holder be-
ing happy about the takedown decisions, making it much more fragile than
legislated liability protection offered by the DMCA. If anything, this lack of
liability protection could lean payment processors even further toward
168. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) requires copyright holders to consider whether the potentially
infringing material is a fair use of a copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 107 before issuing a take-
down notification, and that “anyone who . . . makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of
the copyright with respect to such use”).
169. Payment Processor Agreement, supra note 143, at sec. 1.
170. Id. at sec. 8 (indicating payment services “shall” be suspended or terminated if the
merchant persists in selling infringing products after the initial warning).
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blocking payment in response to notifications, amplifying the impact on
merchant rights. When the payment processor chooses to block payment ser-
vices without an indemnity from the rights holder, it also becomes exposed
to potential merchant claims for breach of service terms, as discussed below
in the Allofmp3.com case. The current “voluntary” systems appear to be a
stick with little carrot for payment processors; the main incentive for partici-
pation was trying to avoid a more onerous legislative regime in the vein of
SOPA/PIPA.
2. Unilateral Denials of Service by Payment Processors
Online payment processors are also engaging in another form of indus-
try self-regulation: unilateral blocks of payment services pursuant to their
company terms of service or policies. PayPal accepts reports of alleged in-
fringement on particular websites or webpages through an e-mail and fax
system. The report must describe what the rights are, how the website in-
fringes and why the reporting party believes PayPal services are being used
to make payment for infringing goods or services.171 Unilateral denials of
payment services present problems both for payment processors when the
merchants fight back and for merchants, because the blocking can be ex-
tremely overbroad. A payment block is a blunt instrument because it is often
all or nothing for a merchant, even if some legal conduct is affected.
PayPal’s unilateral system for payment blockades recognizes this risk of
over blocking in its infringement reporting form:
I understand that this Report may lead to the temporary or perma-
nent restriction of the PayPal account and/or PayPal services associ-
ated with the Webpage. PayPal account restriction has serious
consequences, including the inability of the account holder to use
PayPal services in connection with any business or transaction, not
only those associated with the identified [w]ebpage.172
The AllofMP3.com dispute provides the perfect example of both over-block-
ing of legal merchant activity and the difficult legal position faced by pay-
ment processors who unilaterally deny services. The Russian website,
AllofMP3.com, enabled downloading of copyrighted songs for a small fee.
The service was illegal under U.S. copyright law but legal under Russian
copyright law at the time. While a secondary copyright infringement claim
was pending in U.S. courts, the International Federation for the Phono-
graphic Industry convinced Visa and MasterCard to voluntarily cease
processing all payments for AllofMP3.com. This resulted in blocking of
transactions that were legal in Russia. The operator of AllofMP3.com then
171. See Infringement Report, PayPal Inc. (last visited Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.
paypalobjects.com/webstatic/ua/pdf/US/en_US/infringementreport.pdf.
172. Id.
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successfully sued Visa for breach of its terms of service in a Russian
court.173 The over-blocking was to the disadvantage of Russian users, where
the content was in fact legal, and also to the detriment of the payment
processors who were held liable for the denial of service.
Another recent example of unilateral denial of service is PayPal’s an-
nouncement that it would no longer be processing payments on behalf of
companies offering Virtual Private Network (VPN) services, on the assump-
tion that such companies enable copyright infringement.174 The decision fur-
ther illustrates the problem of over broadness of unilateral payment blocks
for merchants and, in this instance, for their end consumers. PayPal is block-
ing payments to VPN providers, citing the terms of its Acceptable Use Pol-
icy. VPNs enable users to appear as though they are accessing the Internet
from a different physical location. Like peer-to-peer file sharing, VPNs are
known in the media for their illegal purposes, but they also have useful ap-
plications for legal conduct. Copyright holders lament the use of VPNs to
evade geo-blocking of content. For example, a VPN could be used to view
TV programming that is not licensed in the viewer’s home country. How-
ever, the same geo-blocking evasion that makes VPNs such a scourge to
rights holders is being challenged in the European Union as an often-unjusti-
fied restriction on cross-border e-commerce.175 The decision to block pay-
ment services to VPN merchants ignores potentially valuable uses of VPNs
where users want to keep their location private. The classic example is dissi-
dent political actors who want to mask their location to avoid persecution,
but a more mundane and potentially legal application might be engaging in
cross-border shopping. It is also conceivable that a company offering VPN
services could also be offering other services for which it would no longer
be able to accept PayPal payments.  The payment block based on the offer-
ing of VPN services may thus be overly broad, impacting legal conduct to
the great disadvantage of the merchants and users of their services.
173. The judgment was a pyrrhic victory for AllofMP3.com, given that the site shut
down in the interim when the U.S. Trade Representative convinced the Russian government to
make the site illegal through an amendment to Russian law. Robert Mackey, The Day the
Russian Music Service Died?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2006, 7:54 AM), https://thelede.blogs.ny
times.com/2006/12/21/the-day-the-russian-music-service-died/.
174. Apparently without warning, PayPal stopped processing payments for the Canadian
company UnoTelly, a supplier of VPN and SmartDNS services. Glyn Moody, PayPal Blocks
VPN, SmartDNS Provider’s Payments Over Copyright Concerns, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 5,
2016), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/paypal-blocks-vpn-smartdns-providers-pay-
ments-over-copyright-violations/.
175. Council of the European Union Press Release 692/16, Geo-blocking: Council
Agrees to Remove Barriers to E-Commerce (Nov. 28, 1016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2016/11/28-geo-blocking.
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II. EVALUATING OPTIONS FOR THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF ONLINE
PAYMENT PROCESSORS: EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS
The theme across this discussion is that copyright holders are pushing
hard to vindicate their rights online. All indications point toward payment
processors as their target: the cases discussed above, the recent legislative
proposals, and the resulting industry self-regulation. As this push continues,
policy and lawmakers could either (1) allow the continued slow evolution of
common law liability and the self-regulation of online payment processors,
or (2) intervene more purposefully with a statutory DMCA-like safe harbor
extended to some or all payment processors. The latter would involve an
optional trade, in which payment processors who block infringing sales re-
ceive statutory protection from secondary liability. Both options are evalu-
ated in this section based on the criteria of efficiency and fairness.
Whether to impose secondary copyright liability is often discussed in
terms of maximizing efficiency. Authors suggest liability should be imposed
where it minimizes various costs and maximizes the benefits to society over-
all.176 In more specific terms, one author suggests “optimal digital copyright
policy . . . would do two things: deter technological innovators as little as
possible and permit cost-effective enforcement of copyright in the digital
environment.”177
Efficiency of copyright enforcement certainly seems to underlie calls for
secondary infringement liability of online intermediaries. Direct copyright
suits against individual online infringers tend to be costly and ineffective,
because infringers are so numerous, dispersed and hard to track down.178 By
the time the wheels of justice turn, the infringers have set up new, transient
online shops, creating a “whack-a-mole” game for rights holders.179 Even
when a remedy is obtained, it may be small relative to litigation costs and
difficult to enforce in practice if the infringer’s operations are outside of the
U.S. In Visa, Judge Kozinski’s dissent echoes these considerations; he attrib-
utes cases like Fonovisa, Aimster, Grokster, and Amazon to the fact that
176. See, e.g., Haskel, supra note 80, at 423 (“One of the main purposes of secondary
liability is to stop infringement at the least cost to society.”); Douglas Lichtman & William
Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 395 (2003) (proposing an assessment where contributory copyright liability is
determined based on the cost of direct infringement, the benefits of other lawful use, the cost
of modifying behavior and the efficient gains from liability); Hogberg, supra note 39, at 918
(“Contributory Infringement . . . As with vicarious liability, the dominant mode of theoretical
analysis of enterprise liability has traditionally been based on economic efficiency rather than
fairness.”).
177. Lemley & Reese, supra note 20, at 1350.
178. See Blevins, supra note 33, at 1871; Haskel, supra note 80.
179. See, e.g., Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2015 BCCA 265 (Can. B.C.),
leave to appeal to SCC granted, 2017 SCC 34.
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“direct infringers are sometimes too ubiquitous, too small, or too difficult to
find.”180
Third parties—like ISPs, search engines, and payment processors—are
bottlenecks whose control leaves them well positioned to reduce infringe-
ment at a lower cost, faster, and more easily than other stakeholders.181
Judge Kozinski refers to payment processors as having “ready means” to
stop the infringing conduct through simple measures.182 The higher up the
supply chain a copyright holder can target, the less the administrative or
litigation burden there is to enforce rights, because there are fewer parties
involved and greater impact on downstream users.183  From a rights holder’s
perspective, cutting off payment mechanisms is even more effective than
seeking to control content through multiple ISPs or search engines. A pay-
ment block can quickly shut down the entirety of the illegal operator’s busi-
ness, not just one or two webpages like a DMCA notice. From this
perspective, the Payment Processor Agreement seems like an efficient cen-
tralized notice-and-blocking system, saving the rights holder from chasing
each end user who is infringing, or even each payment intermediary, in sepa-
rate litigation.
But the Payment Processor Agreement is far from the only online copy-
right enforcement system. As described for PayPal above, many payment
processors also have unilateral blocking-request systems. As voluntary
agreements and such unilateral policies proliferate, their complexity and
patchiness raise efficiency and effectiveness questions. The American Bar
Association’s Intellectual Property Section argues the emerging voluntary
system is creating large administrative burdens on rights holders who seek
vindication. Similar sentiments were expressed in the House Judiciary Com-
mittee hearings on copyright law reform, where one commentator character-
ized the voluntary agreements as simply “impos[ing] another layer of
notifications.”184 The problem seems likely to worsen in the future as pay-
ment processors sense their rising risk of secondary liability and respond
with more voluntary policing. In comparison, the implementation of a legis-
lated DMCA-like solution could offer greater uniformity, streamlining no-
tice and takedown in a manner that reduces the administration and costs to
the benefit of rights holders.185 Since payment processors are on the receiv-
180. Visa, 494 F.3d at 823 (Kozinksi, J., dissenting).
181. See, e.g., Lemley & Reese, supra note 20, at 1349 (“The high volume of illegal
uses, and the low return to suing any one individual, make it more cost-effective to aim litiga-
tion at targets as far up the chain as possible”).
182. Visa, 494 F.3d at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
183. See, Lemley & Reese, supra note 20, at 1349.
184. Section 512 of Title 17, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop-
erty, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 97 (2014) (statement of
Paul Doda).
185. ABA WHITE PAPER, A CALL FOR ACTION FOR ONLINE PIRACY AND COUNTERFEIT-
ING LEGISLATION supra note 124, at 71 (“Absent implementation of new legislation that cre-
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ing end of the patchwork of rights holder notifications, streamlining into a
single, legislated regime could improve efficiency for them as well.
The other major inefficiency of the status quo—self-regulation with
emerging liability risk—is its potential for over-blocking of online com-
merce. This is a problem inherent in indirect liability lawsuits, which tend to
“sweep together both socially beneficial and socially harmful uses of a pro-
gram or service.”186 As Grokster illustrates, the courts are not well-suited to
design remedies at common law that enable even recognized non-infringing
uses to continue. This is exacerbated by the Payment Processor Agreement
and Rogue Block system, which encourage over-blocking of services. As
discussed above, this industry self-regulating regime takes a rightsholder
centric stance that enables blocks even for non-infringing transactions and
merchants. Even if the merchant provides evidence of non-infringement or
proceeds to litigation, the payment processor can still block the services and
request indemnity from the rights holder.187 The SOPA/PIPA bills suffered
from the same over-blocking malady, requiring mandatory service blocks for
websites with potentially non-infringing content.
Any over-blocking occurring in the current system creates inefficiency
when it prevents legitimate, non-infringing transactions. Even worse, when a
new business model tests the boundaries of established copyright jurispru-
dence—as Grokster and Napster did, and as VPNs may be doing now—it
can be stymied by an inability to obtain payment services. In the face of
uncertain copyright infringement liability, companies like PayPal may refuse
services to business like VPN providers, whose business facilitates both ille-
gal and legal conduct.
A DMCA-like legislative exception for payment processors could rem-
edy some of the over-blocking inefficiency of the current approach. By (1)
tailoring blocks to focus more specifically on illegal transactions or repeat
offenders, as discussed in the next section proposing initial considerations
for the design of a safe harbor and (2) creating more robust merchant protec-
tions, such as effective counter-notice or delayed blocking, to allow time for
merchant challenges. A legislative solution could expressly clarify when
payment processors are not liable. Like the DMCA, it could reduce mone-
tary risks for payment processors who process transactions of indeterminate
legality by restricting remedies to injunctive relief.188 By clarifying the scope
of liability and limiting remedies in these ways, a legislative exception could
ates greater uniformity among such initiatives, the burden that falls on copyright owners will
only continue to grow, as new technologies rapidly evolve beyond the scope of protections and
safe harbors currently covered by the DMCA, and which may make policing efforts less cen-
tralized and more expensive.”).
186. Lemley & Reese, supra note 20 at 1350.
187. Payment Processor Agreement, supra note 143 at sec. 11.
188. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (j) (describing the rules for applications for injunctions against
online service providers).
88 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 24:45
reduce the uncertainty that drives inefficient over blocking, such as denials
of service to innovative business models.
In addition to efficiency, several authors also discuss “fairness” as a
theoretical basis for the imposition of secondary infringement liability.189
This trends to encompass both procedural fairness in the notice and blocking
processes and substantive fairness in who bears the burden of action.
Procedural fairness considerations might include the right of merchants
to dispute allegations of copyright infringement in a timely manner, either
before or after a payment blockade is imposed. They might also encompass
consideration of who bears the initial power to decide that a payment block
will be imposed and whether there is any unbiased ultimate oversight of
blocking decisions.
Substantive fairness considerations might include correlating burden
with benefit in the imposition of liability. If third parties benefit financially
from the infringement of others, some argue that party should bear a corre-
lating burden of policing against the related infringement. Judge Kozinski’s
dissent in Visa takes this tack, objecting to payment processors “collecting
billions for sellers of stolen merchandise; in a very real sense, they [payment
processors] profit from making piracy possible.”190 This contributes to Judge
Kozinski’s conclusion that Visa and MasterCard should be liable. From this
substantive fairness perspective, the argument would be that it is unjust to
allow intermediaries to profit from piracy if they are well positioned to stop
it. A further question is whether in exchange for assuming that proportionate
policing obligation, some corresponding benefit, such as liability protection,
would also be fair.
Current voluntary systems seem to fall short on measurements of proce-
dural fairness for merchants. The Payment Processor Agreement was created
by copyright owners and intermediaries and has predictably oriented the sys-
tems toward rights holders and blunt blocking of services. The payment
processors hold the power to decide whether content is infringing, with no
judicial backstop as there is under the DMCA. Professor Annemarie Bridy
observes that the Payment Processor Agreement scheme “substitutes the hur-
ried judgment of a participating intermediary for the more deliberate judg-
ment of a court,” leaving this approach wanting on procedural fairness.191
There is minimal recourse for merchants to challenge decisions, and experi-
189. MacCarthy, supra note 82, at 1055 (arguing normative considerations of fairness
should be taken into account, in addition to efficiency, when determining whether to impose
secondary infringement liability); Hogberg, supra note 39, at 919 (discussing fairness and
culpability as concerns of contributory copyright liability, along with economic efficiency);
Bridy, supra note 4, at 1560 (discussing online payment blockade from a fairness perspective);
Blevins, supra note 34, at 1871–72 (discussing how the imposition of secondary liability pro-
motes fairness by imposing costs on those who benefit from the infringement).
190. Visa, 494 F.3d at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
191. Bridy, supra note 4 at 1560.
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ence to date shows merchants rarely make use of the recourse that is af-
forded to them.
Although the DMCA has faced criticism for promoting over-takedown
of content, it offers at least some user rights protection through judicial over-
sight. Recent decisions encourage fair use, and illustrate how this oversight
protects users’ rights to a greater extent than voluntary systems with no neu-
tral arbiter.192 The same features of the DMCA-like system that could reduce
over-blocking from an efficiency perspective, discussed above, would also
improve fairness for merchants by encouraging more proportionate blocking
of services.
Existing voluntary systems also seem substantively unfair for payment
processors. Payment blocks, whether purely unilateral or pursuant to the
Payment Processor Agreement, impose costs and obligations on payment
processors akin to that of legislated notice and takedown under the DMCA,
yet fail to offer the equivalent legal assurances against secondary copyright
infringement liability of the DMCA. Reviewing and actioning notices for
payment blocks inevitably consumes business resources of online in-
termediaries. As early as 2004, eBay was already spending $20 million each
year on tools to promote trust and safety on its website through a department
with 4,000 employees, 200 of whom “focus exclusively on combatting in-
fringement.”193 The resources dedicated to voluntarily minimizing infringe-
ment have no doubt skyrocketed since then and are similarly incurred by
other online payment processors. Yet the protections from secondary liabil-
ity are tenuous under the Payment Processor Agreement. It is not clear that
under a DMCA-like regime the expenditures would be less, but at least the
efforts would be in exchange for legislated secondary liability protections
that eliminate the potential for monetary damages.
Finally, when the DMCA is involved in litigation, it arguably influences
upward the standard for the conduct that meets certain elements of secon-
dary copyright infringement, such as knowledge. A legislative exception
could have the same influence in cases against payment processors. This is
an added advantage to the DMCA-like option for online payment processors
as they face secondary infringement jurisprudence edging toward inclusion
of their business models.
Overall, a DMCA-like legislative safe harbor approach seems preferable
based on the criteria of efficiency and fairness. A single legislative approach
would be more efficient than the existing patchwork of voluntary systems. It
could help to reduce inefficient over-blocking of legitimate commerce and
the accompanying unfairness for merchants. A DMCA-like option would
192. See e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp, 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (vindicating
user rights by requiring that copyright holders consider the fair use doctrine in filing a take-
down notice claiming copyright infringement).
193. Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 98.
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also offer payment processors stronger liability protection than the current
voluntary systems, and perhaps even influence upward the legal standards
for when their conduct would trigger secondary copyright infringement. As
an added advantage, the DMCA-like approach has been in existence since
1998, making it familiar to stakeholders.
Although the DMCA is far from perfect, it recognized early that a flour-
ishing online marketplace required balance between reasonably efficient on-
line copyright enforcement and the promotion of online commerce. Under
the DMCA’s influence, online commerce has become an essential part of the
U.S. economy. But online payment processors are the keystone to continued
success of e-commerce. The rising potential for secondary copyright liability
of online payment processors, recent legislative proposals, and questionable
voluntary systems all suggest it is time to bring a similar balance to copy-
right enforcement against these intermediaries.
III. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DESIGN OF AN ONLINE PAYMENT
PROCESSOR SAFE HARBOR FOR THE FUTURE
The DMCA experience over the last nearly twenty years provides valua-
ble insight into areas of effectiveness and flaws.194 The precise contours of a
notice and payment blocking regime for payment processors could easily be
the subject of another paper, but the following considerations will need to be
taken into account at an early stage.
There are logical changes to the DMCA regime that would clearly be
required to “fit” the safe harbor concept to online payment processors. For
example, payment processors benefit financially from infringing sales,
which seems likely to make them ineligible under the DMCA safe harbor
exclusion of intermediaries who “receive a financial benefit directly attribu-
table to the infringing activity.”195 The DMCA’s financial-benefit criteria
would have to be modified in a safe harbor applicable to payment
processors.
By far the greatest substantive challenge is designing a safe harbor that
balances the blunt nature of a payment blockade. As the contentious SOPA/
PIPA regimes illustrate, both infringing and non-infringing transactions can
occur on the same website or on different websites of the same merchant, yet
all are impacted by a refusal to provide payment services to the merchant.
This raises concerns about the inefficiency and broader social costs of over-
blocking legitimate e-commerce. It may even go so far as to implicate the
free speech and open-Internet concerns that sparked outrage over SOPA/
194. The current consultation by the Copyright Office on section 512 of the DMCA
could also provide some unique insights into modifications that could apply to the design of a
payment processor regime. See generally Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public
Comment, supra note 8.
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2).
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PIPA. To introduce a successful safe harbor regime for payment processors,
some form of tailoring at a process and technical level is required to balance
the potential blockage of non-infringing transactions. Three possible ap-
proaches to this tailoring are canvassed here: a notice-and-notice approach, a
“critical volume” approach, and a three-strikes approach.
The DCMA regime has faced criticism for promoting over-takedown,
where non-infringing content is removed simply because it is the easiest
response for intermediaries.196 One proposal put forth to remediate this issue
in the DMCA is delaying takedown to allow time for counter notice. Rather
than the current DMCA approach of immediate takedown upon notice from
the rights holder, with the potential for later “put-back” of the content if a
counter notice is sent, the proposed change would delay takedown to provide
the subject of the notice with a chance to respond (called a “notice-and-
notice” approach). A similar process for the regime applicable to payment
processors could improve, although not fix, the over-blockage problem. It
would give merchants the chance to provide specifics in their counter notice
about their business, allowing the block to be tailored or declined by the
payment processor (assuming the technical feasibility of such tailoring). The
challenge with this approach is merchants would self-identify their infring-
ing activity. Although evidence to refute the infringement claim could be
required for a valid counter notice, it seems likely that the more egregious an
offender, the more likely they are to provide dishonest information on in-
fringement in their counter notice. This would undermine the effectiveness
of the system to at least some extent.
Another possible approach to reduce over-blockage of payment process-
ing is to implement a block only when a critical threshold of a website’s
content appears to be infringing. When a rights holder can show that a web-
site is predominantly engaging in sales of infringing goods, a payment block
could be imposed. As Professor Mark Lemley observes, the level of in-
fringement in the seminal cases seems to fall on a continuum; in Napster,
approximately 87-99% of the end use appeared to be infringing, whereas in
Grokster the rough estimates were lower at around 75% infringing use.197 A
blocking system that could differentiate between the predominantly infring-
ing sites and those with mixed use or predominantly non-infringing sales
would reduce the concern over blocking legitimate e-commerce. This would
be straightforward for websites like TheBagAddiction.com in Gucci, which
exclusively sold infringing goods. If sites are in fact more mixed in the le-
gality of their offerings, one challenge of this approach is potential gaming
by merchants. For example, if seven out of ten products offered are infring-
196. See, e.g., HASKEL, supra note 80, at 435 (referring to a 2006 study by Urban &
Quilter suggesting DMCA section 512 protections were tilted in favor of copyright holders and
that allegedly infringing material was often taken down even when the infringement claim is
suspect).
197. Lemley & Reese, supra note 20, at 1380–81.
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ing, a merchant could add another three “dummy” non-infringing products
that it never expects to sell, leaving the payment processor in the difficult
position of adjudicating which sites are “predominantly” infringing.
Perhaps the most feasible idea is to tailor payment processing blocks
based on a three-strikes approach pursuant to which only repeat offenders
are punished with a full payment block. Initially, copyright holders could be
required to give notice to a payment processor that identifies specific in-
fringing items, just as specific content is identified in valid DMCA notices.
If specific transactions are identifiable, the amount of those transactions
could be clawed back by the payment processor. When a merchant reaches a
certain number of incidents, based on actioned notices from copyright
holder(s), the payment processor could escalate to impose a full payment
processing block on the merchant. This approach is reminiscent of the
DMCA requirement that intermediaries have a policy of terminating repeat
infringers.198 If anything, payment processors are better positioned than the
online intermediaries already covered by the DMCA to track and communi-
cate with merchants whose accounts are the subject of repeated copyright
violation claims, making it more feasible to implement such a three-strikes
approach in a manner that is fair to merchants.
In addition, there is a question as to the scope of the DMCA’s protection
against secondary liability. Some cases treat the elements that disqualify an
intermediary from the safe harbor—such as financial benefit and the right
and ability to control—as being identical to the parallel elements of claims
for contributory infringement and vicarious liability.199 This approach means
evidence that suffices to prove secondary liability necessarily also excludes
the intermediary from the safe harbor protections, so the DMCA protects
only from direct infringement liability. This Article is based on the more
logical view that the DMCA protects from secondary liability because the
thresholds for proving disqualification from the safe harbors are higher than
that of which is required to show secondary liability. Since there is no cur-
rent intimation of direct copyright infringement by payment processors when
they process merchant transactions, to be useful a safe harbor would have to
resolve this ambiguity in the DMCA model in favor of providing protection
from secondary liability.
Lastly, a key consideration in designing a payment processor safe harbor
is defining which intermediaries or technologies are covered. Each party in
the payment chain has a different role, amount of knowledge, and technol-
ogy. As Gucci illustrates, these roles vary widely. PayPal itself plays differ-
ing roles, as merchant of record to enable Visa and MasterCard payments, or
198. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (policy must provide “for the termination in ap-
propriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or
network who are repeat infringers.”).
199. See, e.g., In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
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offering its own PayPal-branded online payment services. The distinctions
could be important in determining the requirements imposed on an interme-
diary in order to qualify for a safe harbor.
Lessons can be learned here from the DMCA, where a major criticism is
the static nature of the intermediary categories covered by the legislation.
The types of online service providers covered are the main intermediaries
that were in existence in 1998, at least in the minds of legislators. New
intermediaries, like peer-to-peer file sharers and of course payment in-
termediaries, were left without safe harbor protection even though their in-
clusion might have been desirable from a policy perspective. Striving for a
safe harbor that stands the test of time for payment processors is already of
great importance as new technologies, like Bitcoin, emerge.200 Bitcoin, and
other virtual currencies, have no central intermediaries and would therefore
pose distinct challenges in determining how and to whom a safe harbor
would apply.201
CONCLUSION
Policing online copyright infringement is complex for all involved—
copyright holders, online intermediaries, the courts, legislators, and
merchants. Jurisprudence on secondary copyright infringement is reaching
toward intermediaries that are increasingly tangential to the direct infringe-
ment, as rights holders seek new ways to battle rampant online violations.
The reasoning in recent cases, when applied to online payment processors,
suggests their business model puts them at a higher risk of secondary copy-
right liability than traditional credit card companies. Recently proposed leg-
islation and industry self-regulation have also taken aim at the role of
payment processors in reducing online copyright infringement.
This significant attention begs the question of whether online payment
processors should be granted legislative protection from secondary copyright
infringement liability. Other online intermediaries are provided with such
protection under the DMCA, in exchange for their assistance in policing
online infringement. DMCA-like safe harbors offer efficiency and fairness
200. Bitcoin is a virtual currency that relies on blockchain technology to operate, which
involves public key encryption and a public ledger. Although Bitcoin is the poster child, there
are an estimated 600 virtual currencies relying on similar technology, including the now de-
funct “Coinye,” which features Kanye West’s face. See Gold Diggers Defeated: Kanye West
Wins Legal Battle Against Digital Currency Coinye, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 2014), http://
www.theguardian.com/music/shortcuts/2014/jul/27/kanye-west-head-on-coinye-cryptocurren
cy.
201. See generally Parker Higgins, In the Silk Road Case, Don’t Blame the Technology,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/10/
silk-road-case-dont-blame-technology. The distinction between PayPal and Bitcoin, one cen-
tralized and one decentralized, for payment processing, is reminiscent of the similar distinction
drawn between Napster and Grokster, although both file sharing services were ultimately
found outside the DMCA safe harbor.
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advantages for merchants, online payment processors and copyright holders
that make them preferable to the current gradual evolution of liability and
industry self-regulation. The design of such safe harbors in practice raises
complex considerations of scope and practical application that require fur-
ther examination. With or without safe harbors, the evolution of secondary
copyright infringement will continue to pose complex questions of balance
between the robustness of e-commerce and the ability of copyright holders
to vindicate their rights online.
